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Abstract
The era between the Civil War and WWII was one of revolutionary change within the American
family. Family size continued its long-term decline and by the 1930s fertility was not much above
contemporary levels (later rising during the baby boom). The schooling of older children expanded
tremendously, as epitomized by the ￿ high school movement.￿Additionally, the proportion of married
females￿adulthood devoted to market-oriented activities increased, even as market-oriented activity
performed at home declined. Horri￿c rates of infant and child mortality declined dramatically (with
more gradual gains since). Thus, this interval contained the emergence of many important features
of contempoary families. This paper considers these trends jointly through calibration of succes-
sive generations of representative husband and wife households who choose the quantity and quality
of children, household production, and the extent of mother￿ s involvement in market-oriented pro-
duction. One important contribution is that standard explanations such as rising wages, declining
mortality, skill-biased technological change, curriculum improvements during the high school move-
ment, reductions in morbidity, and reduced time costs of children cannot in combination reduce
fertility to observed levels or increase stocks of human capital to levels seen to be necessary by the
calibrations. Instead, a rising relative preference for child quality over quantity is also required,
leading to an increased share of potential family income devoted to child education, child consump-
tion and an increase in time mother￿ s investments in child quality. A second signi￿cant contribution
is the gathering of information and strategies employed to present reasonable quantitative depictions
of the behavior of cohorts over an interval in which signi￿cant data limitations are pervasive.
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01 Introduction
The era between the Civil War and WWII included many revolutionary changes in the American family,
as it obtained many of it￿ s contemporary features. Family size continued its long-term decline and by
the 1930s fertility was not much above current levels (later rising during the baby boom). The schooling
of older children expanded tremendously, as epitomized by the ￿ high school movement.￿ Although the
trend toward increased schooling expanded to encompass college for many in subsequent generations,
this earlier period ￿rmly established the centrality of education to good employment. Additionally,
the proportion of married females￿adulthood devoted to market-oriented activities increased, even as
market-oriented activity performed at home declined. Although those marrying in the mid-1920s still
typically quit work outside the home with a ￿rst birth, many returned in the 1940s after their children
had matured so that life-cycle rates of participation increased signi￿cantly. Even though the work-
family balance continued to shift powerfully toward work in subsequent decades, the earlier period
established that market work by married females was a serious and acceptable option. The Progressive
Era included the extension of the franchise to all female adults and, relatedly, the introduction of many
public health initiatives. Finally, horri￿c rates of infant and child mortality declined dramatically.
Although such mortality at the end of the period under consideration remained above current levels,
there was much higher con￿dence that a child born would not die during dependency.
This paper considers these trends jointly through calibration of successive generations of represen-
tative husband and wife households who choose the quantity and quality of their children, household
production, and the extent of mother￿ s involvement in market-oriented production. Exogenous rates of
infant and child mortality, returns to labor market experience, skill premiums, various costs of children,
and cohort income levels are model inputs used to generate time paths for schooling inputs, fertil-
ity, mother￿ s market work, and wages, including the gender wage ratio. These outputs enable us to
determine the ￿t of the model and assess proposed explanations of family change. One important con-
tribution is the ￿nding that standard explanations such as rising wages, declining mortality, skill-biased
technological change, curriculum improvements during the high school movement, and reduced time
costs of children cannot in combination reduce fertility to observed levels or increase stocks of human
capital to levels seen to be necessary by the calibrations. Slower acquisition of human capital via work
experience over the period is (only) one reason the pace of the quantity-quality trade-o⁄ found in the
calibrations is below what is observed empirically.
For the calibrations to replicate observed behavior an increased ￿ taste￿for child well-being is required.
This is modeled as a rising relative preference for child quality over quantity, an increased share of
potential family income devoted to child consumption, and an increase in time mothers invest in each
1child￿ s quality. When calibrated under these assumptions the model ￿ts the observed changes in the
family quite well. This increased taste for child well-being is consistent with increased bargaining
power for wives within marriage and a stronger relative preference for child quality among mothers
than fathers. A second signi￿cant contribution is the gathering of information and strategies employed
to present reasonable quantitative depictions of the behavior of cohorts over an interval in which
signi￿cant data limitations are pervasive.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief description of the historical period,
the stylized facts to be explained, and those factors deemed to explain them. This is followed in
section III by a selective review of literature. Section IV presents the model. Section V explains the
calibration strategy. This is followed by a presentation of calibration results in section VI. A ￿nal
section summarizes and concludes.
2 The Historical Setting
The ￿ second￿industrial revolution of the Post-Civil War decades involved the spread of large-scale
unskilled labor-saving capital equipment powered by, ￿rst steam, then electricity. These new machines
often substituted for human muscles (cf Galor and Weil (1996)), opening the door for more women
to be employed in manufacturing. The new machines also increased the demand for skilled blue-
collar workers to design and service machines. Large-batch and continuous process technologies led to
increases in the number of employees per ￿rm, adding layers of bureaucracy which greatly increased
the need for clerical workers (cf. Goldin (1990)). Clerical employees needed more than rudimentary
reading, writing, and arithmetic skills; business skills such as an understanding of basic book keeping
and the ability to type were also increasingly necessary.
Acquisition of these skills required additional training, either on the job, in high school, or in business
schools. In the early transition this increase in demand was met by on￿ the-job training of high-skill blue
collar workers among men and learning-by-doing in manufacturing among females. Productivity would
be lower initially as employees had not yet learned how to perform the tasks required for job mastery.
Also, since the human capital acquired was ￿rm or industry speci￿c, workers presumably paid for at
least some portion of their training costs through lower wages. As they mastered their tasks, less output
was lost to learning and productivity was higher because of the additional experience-based skill. For
this reason, the returns to experience were quite high in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Conversely, many jobs around 1900 required little schooling. Literacy was valued, but productivity in
handicrafts and manufacturing depended more on work experience than general school knowledge. A
few jobs required signi￿cant schooling (such as book keeper, clergy and school teacher), but for most
2jobs literacy was su¢ cient.
As skill-biased technical change proceeded, many of the prerequisites to performing advanced design
and mechanical engineering jobs could just as easily-and perhaps less expensively- be taught in school.
With no comparative advantage in the provision of this basic knowledge, ￿rms began to require such
training before a man seeking a profession was hired. Similarly, with the expansion of clerical jobs,
females learned typing, stenography, and basics of book keeping in the classroom. The returns to
experience fell as draftsmen and machinists came to acquire their knowledge at school in ￿ shop￿courses,
while the return to education beyond literacy was increasing (the premium to ￿ advanced,￿or high school
training, remained high). Returns to experience have, however, recovered in the past few decades
(Olivetti (2006)).
Advances in transportation equipment and farm machinery increasingly allowed machines to sub-
stitute for human muscles, reducing the premium paid to strong males. Thus, over the ￿rst few decades
of the twentieth century, muscle power and work experience came to be less important determinants of
pay, while the contribution of schooling to earnings increased. These factors contributed to a narrowing
of the wage gap between men and women. The declining premium for muscles depressed men￿ s earnings
relative to women￿ s. Also, men in general had much more experience than women in the late nineteenth
century, so as the premium to experience fell, the impact was greater for men. Indeed, in 1890 the
vast majority of females ceased work upon marriage, so that the number of years of experience for
most females would be few. However, women born in the twentieth century devoted a larger portion
of their lives to market work, narrowing the experience gap. Indeed, Goldin (1986, 1990) and Goldin
and Polachek (1987) argue that higher average premiums for experience for females relative to males
accounts for close to 30 percent of the narrowing of the gender wage gap over the longer period from
1890 to 1970.
As the labor market adjusted to a higher demand for skilled workers, the premium paid to high school
graduates remained high or even increased. Before the high school movement, most high schools were
private and attended only by children of the a› uent. High schools were then most often preparatory
for college and learned professions, such as the clergy. Indeed, of those few high school graduates the
proportion who continued on to college in the late nineteenth century was perhaps 50%, a ￿gure which
declined with the onset of the high school movement and would not be exceeded until the 1960s (even
as the proportion of successive birth cohorts attending college increased steadily (Goldin and Katz
(2008)). With the onset of the high school movement, a larger proportion of those students attending
high school viewed a diploma as a terminal degree. Schools responded to the di⁄erent preparatory
needs of their students by dropping Latin from the curriculum and adding ￿ shop￿and typing courses.
3An equally important change in the curriculum was the decline of the one-room schoolhouse which was
gradually supplanted by graded schools.
Through the ￿rst decade of the twentieth century high school attendance and graduation rates were
low and increasing only slowly. Low attendance meant the general populace was unwilling to publicly
support secondary schools. In turn, private tuition and room and board kept attendance from rising
high enough to encourage public support. Further, in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, a
family￿ s secondary earners were more often older children rather than wives. Especially in poor families,
children could not have been spared for higher education even if tuition was heavily subsidized.
After 1910, though, as incomes rose and population densities increased, public secondary education
began to spread widely. During the peak years of the ￿ high school movement￿ , between 1910 and 1940,
the high school graduation rate among youth rose from 9 percent to 50% (Goldin and Katz(2008, 195)).
Not only was the quantity of education received increasing, but so also was its quality as measured by
schooling expenditures. Real expenditures per youth aged 5-19 more than tripled between 1910 and
1950.
Goldin and Katz (2008) view the wage premium to skill as the outcome of a ￿ race￿between skill-
biased-technical change, which increases the demand for skilled labor, and increases in the supply of
skilled workers such as high school graduates. In the latter 19th century and into the 1910s the skill
premium remained high as increases in the supply and demand for skills were moderate and roughly
o⁄setting. The explosion in skilled workers with the high school movement, though, led to an appreciable
reduction in the premium to skills. Indeed, Goldin and Katz (2008, p. 316) ￿nd that "from 1910 to
1930 the skill premium fell by 1.28 percent per year on average."
The shift in total labor demand toward o¢ ce workers reduced the proportion of the workforce
for which large muscles were a big advantage, reducing the relative productivity and pay of males
(cf. Goldin and Polachek (1987)). Female clerical workers were more likely to return to work as
their children matured, so that the life cycle labor participation of married females increased as the
proportion of females working in clerical occupations soared. This helped produce the rise in the married
female labor force participation rate from 4.6 in 1890 to 21.6 in 1950 (Goldin (1990, p. 17, Table 2.1)).
The rise in schooling, lower premium to male strength, and increase in female market experience all
contributed to a narrowing of the gender wage gap. Goldin(1990) reports that between 1890 and the
1930s the gender wage gap in the economy as a whole closed from .46 to .56, narrowing only slightly
more to .60 by 1970.
Families were also becoming smaller as wives gave birth to fewer children . This trend was not new,
as fertility had been declining in the United States from at least the early nineteenth century. Jones and
4Tertilt (2007) and Murphy, Simon and Tamura (2008) analyze historical cohort fertility in the United
States based on self reports of retrospective fertility of ever-married women coded in various Census
years. Women born in the 1850s who eventually married attained adulthood circa 1880 and would bear
about 5 children. Females born only a half century later, with fertility centered about 1930, end up
bearing only about 2.5 children, or roughly half that of their grandmothers.
There was a smaller decline in the number of children who would survive to adulthood than in
fertility, as deaths during infancy and childhood declined from horri￿c levels. Mortality was high and
variable in the United States until the last decades of the nineteenth century. High baseline mortal-
ity was spiked by periodic epidemics of cholera, typhoid, yellow fever, in￿ uenza and other infectious
diseases. However, in the 1870s or 1880s mortality began a rapid descent to much lower levels. The
white infant mortality rate, i.e., deaths in the ￿rst year of life per thousand live births￿ which was
staggering 214.8 in 1880￿ had declined to 120.1 in 1900 and to 26.8 by 1950 (Haines, 2000, Table 4.3);
these rates were appreciably higher for black children. Children who survived infancy were at lower,
but still signi￿cant, risk of death. Of 100 children born in 1880, an additional 12 died between the ages
of 1 and 15 (Murphy, Simon Tamura, 2008, Tables 14 and 15).
Preston and Haines (1991) describe how the mortality transition was facilitated by massive public
investments in clean drinking water and hygienic waste removal as well as advances in scienti￿c under-
standing. Once the germ theory of disease gained acceptance, practices such as washing hands before
eating, quarantining those who are ill, boiling water, pasteurizing milk, and keeping living areas clean,
boosted health and reduced mortality. Many vaccines were introduced beginning in the latter nine-
teenth century, including cholera and typhoid, and for diphtheria, whooping cough, and tuberculosis
early in the twentieth century. The discoveries of sulfa drugs in the 1930s, then mass production of
penicillin in the 1940s, helped further reduce mortality and perhaps morbidity (Preston and Haines,
1991).
Mokyr (2000) argues that new understandings of the role of hygiene in preventing sickness and
death led mothers to devote more time to housework. Mothers, he argues, now believed that through
their e⁄orts they could directly lower the probability of child death. Further, with the mechanisms of
disease still poorly understood, housewives made sure that any error in their e⁄ort would be on the
side of too much, rather than too little, cleanliness. Whereas God￿ s Will had previously been the sole
determinant of which children lived and died, now cleanliness had risen next to Godliness. Mothers￿
obsession with cleanliness, he argues, delayed the onset of female market work.
More generally, this period was one of rising female power. The right of women to vote was
formalized by the 19th amendment to the United States Constitution in 1920. As described above,
5more women were working for pay, and those who did earned an appreciably larger proportion of men￿ s
earnings than had been the case a generation before. Further, women spent less time debilitated in
pregnancy and were empowered to reduce the rate at which their children succumbed to illness.
3 Literature review
There is an immense literature on the topics of the high school movement, fertility decline, gender wage
gap, mortality decline, and role of women-including the rise in market work among married females,
for the United States. The following discussion is, of necessity, highly selective.
The scope, causes and implications of the high school movement are examined in depth by Goldin
and Katz (2008). They blend statistics on school enrollments and characteristics, and trends in wage
skill premiums, with deep appreciation of the interactions among technological change, institutions, and
returns to education. Skill-biased technological change increased the demand for skilled, well-educated
workers, while community characteristics (such as size of manufacturing base and homogeneity of
citizenry) help explain the timing, nationally and regionally, of the increases in education.
Since parents incur most costs of education, such as tuition and foregone earnings and housework of
children, while their children in adulthood reap the higher salaries education provides, most formulations
of schooling decisions assume parents are altruistic toward children (cf. Becker (1981)). That high
school attendance was low in the late nineteenth century, even though the increase in earnings from
high school was high, suggests some form of credit market imperfection (cf. Becker and Tomes (1986),
Galor and Ziera (2004)). Becker and Tomes point out that parents cannot legally assign debt to children.
This means that parental ￿nance of children￿ s education reduces parental consumption. Consequently,
altruistic parents of limited means- relative to the cost of the fully e¢ cient level of child education- are
forced to make di¢ cult trade-o⁄s between own consumption and investments in child quality. When this
results in investments in children that are ine¢ ciently low, parents are said to be ￿ transfer-constrained￿
(Lord (2002, Ch. 6). Among such parents, all intergenerational transfers motivated by altruism will
take the form of human capital bequests; ￿nancial transfers will be zero. Rangazas (2000) reports
simulations indicating that a macro growth model based on such transfer constraints performs much
better relative to observed growth characteristics of the U.S. than does a framework in which parents
always make the fully e¢ cient investments in their children. In the framework developed below we
follow the lead of this literature and limit transfers to children to human capital bequests.
Lord and Rangazas (2006) develop a model of the demographic transition and rise of schooling
investments since 1800. Their framework also assumes altruistic parents, while emphasizing the role of
declining wealth from family enterprise in reducing fertility. An important mechanism raising schooling
6investments over time is that parental human capital is increasing relative to that of their still-dependent
children. This reduces the potential foregone earnings of children from school attendance relative to
family earnings. In this way the utility opportunity cost of schooling children declines. The framework
we develop highlights a similar mechanism.
Goldin and Katz (2008) argue that the returns to a year of education have varied not only over
time but also across education or skill levels at a point in time. They view these patterns as resulting
from interactions among the demand for and supply of skill, and institutions. Skill-biased technological
change (SBTC), which increases the demand for skilled or educated labor, accelerated in the latter
nineteenth century and then preceded at a fairly steady rate throughout the twentieth century. They
note that during the early acceleration, high school enrollments were low and the premium to skill was
bid up. As high school graduation rates soared after 1915 the premium to skill was bid down.
Goldin (1990) presents extensive evidence on the earnings of women relative to men, and why they
changed over time, across sectors and occupations. She ￿nds that from 1890 to the 1930s there was a
signi￿cant narrowing of the gender wage gap. In Goldin and Polachek (1987) this narrowing is quan-
titatively partitioned into roles for changing amounts and returns to experience, increases in the level
and returns to education1, discrimination, and changing rewards to other gender characteristics (male
strength in particular). Increases in education are found to be most important, perhaps accounting for
more than 40 percent. Increases in the work experience of women relative to men are only somewhat
less important. Goldin (1990) and Goldin and Katz (2008) argue that changes in work responsibilities
along with a shift in training away from on-the-job and into schools reduced the returns to experience;
with a greater portion of work skills developed via high school attendance, there was less scope for
productivity advance from experience. For this reason, from 1890 to WWII the increase in total human
capital, obtained either on the job or at work, rises less rapidly than trends in the level and returns to
schooling alone (controlling for experience) would suggest.
Goldin (1990) chronicles the rise in female labor force participation, stressing important roles for
changes in the economy￿ s occupational distribution (especially the rise of the clerical sector), and for
institutions (marriage bars slowed the increase). Adeshade (2009) and Rotella (1980, 1981) envision
that an exogenous increase in high school attendance induced skill-biased technical change in o¢ ce
machines. Innovators foresaw that a large pool of educated females willing to work at wages below
males would complement skill-biased o¢ ce equipment. They responded to these incentives by designing
and manufacturing o¢ ce machinery, which increased the demand for female clerical workers, pulling
them from the home sector. Galor and Weil (1996) suppose that capital deepening accompanying the
1More generally, Goldin and Katz (2008) show the return to a year￿ s education varies both over time and across levels
of education. This is discussed further in the calibration section.
7second industrial revolution decreased the return to strength, narrowing the gender wage gap, reducing
fertility and increasing married female labor force participation rates (MFLFPRs).
Other theories of the rise in MFLFPRs appeal to technological change in household production.
According to Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005) the rise of labor-saving capital goods in the
household (clothes washers, dryers, vacuum cleaners, dishwashers, etc.), in combination with diminish-
ing marginal utility of non-tradeable goods produced in the household, reduced the marginal value of
females￿time in the household sector. In their model, increases in the quantity and quality of durable
household appliances (which they model as declines in their price) reduce the reservation wages of
females, increasing MFLFPRs in the middle of the 20th century. In a theoretical calibration exercise
they ￿nd that half of the increase in MFLFPRs was due to labor-saving technology in the home. Bailey
and Collins (2010) confront the claims of Greenwood et al. with spatial data regarding the spread of
electricity and trends in fertility. They ￿nd little evidence to support the claims of Greenwood et al.
Albanesi and Olivetti (2007) argue that technological improvements related to the bearing and nursing
of children were instrumental to the rise in the labor force participation of mothers. FernÆndez, Fogli
and Olivetti (2004) propose a role for culture in the rise of MFLFPRs. They ￿nd that males whose
own mothers had worked are more likely to prefer a spouse who works. Mokyr (2000) argues that new
understandings of the role of hygiene in preventing sickness and death led late nineteenth and early
twentieth century mothers to devote more time to housework. Mothers, he argues, now believed that
through their e⁄orts they could directly lower the probability of child death. Further, with the mech-
anisms of disease still poorly understood, housewives made sure that any error in their e⁄ort would
be on the side of too much, rather than too little, cleanliness. Mothers￿obsession with cleanliness, he
argues, delayed the expansion of female market work. 2
Fertility in the U.S. fell through the 19th century until sometime in the 1930s, then rose during the
baby boom years, before falling to roughly replacement levels in recent decades. Jones and Tertilt (2007)
present time-series evidence on U.S. fertility and some of its correlates. They ￿nd a strong negative
2In the context of economic development, Soares and Falcao (2008) consider linkages among adult longevity and
MFLFP. In their framwork increases in adult life expectancy are the major driver of the rise in human capital, the decline
in fertility and the movement of married women from the home to the market sector. They point out that increases in own
adult longevity lengthen the period over which investments in own market-oriented human capital can be recouped. This
increases human capital investments by females in their early adulthood, inducing them to substitute away from fertility
and increase market work. They also consider implications for investments in the human capital of children. To the extent
that the production of child quality utilizes mother￿ s time (and no goods), adult longevity has an ambiguous e⁄ect on
child quality: greater adult longevity for children increases the returns to their market human capital, but mother￿ s higher
human capital increases the opportunity cost of investing in children. Hazan and Zobai (2006) examine e⁄ects on parental
human capital investments in children of perfectly foreseen increased longevity of children in adulthood. They point out
that when parents receive utility from the aggregate earnings of children in adulthood, increases in longevity increase the
returns to both quantity and quality. Consequently, increased longevity need not lead to fertility decline and increased
education. However, Hazan (2009) shows that increased adult longevity in the United States over the period we consider
was associated with lower, rather than higher, life cycle market work among men. His ￿nding limits the relevance of the
Soares and Falcao mechanisms for the current study.
8relationship between the occupational income of fathers and household fertility. A similarly strong
negative relationship is found between the education of the husband and/or wife and fertility. If there is
positive assortative spousal mating on education, all of these ￿ndings are consistent with Becker￿ s (1981)
observation that children require signi￿cant time, and that as the value of time (especially mother￿ s
wages) increases, children become more expensive. So long as children are treated symmetrically and
parents care about both the quantity and quality (i.e., earnings in adulthood) of children, higher
wages would reduces fertility and simultaneously induce a substitution toward child quality . Lord and
Rangazas (2006) simulate changes in the quantity and quality of children in the U.S. for the past two
centuries. They argue that an important determinant of the quantity-quality trade-o⁄ is the decline in
wealth from family businesses, which serves to reduce fertility.
Doepke (2005) examines implications of reductions in child mortality using several variants of the
Barro-Becker (1988) model of intergenerational altruism and endogenous fertility. He ￿nds that in each
variant the number of children ever born declines, while the number of surviving children increases. His
results suggest that declining infant and child mortality cannot by themselves explain the large decline
in net reproduction rates observed in the United States (and other industrialized countries) over the last
century. Our results below are consistent with those models￿predictions and we seek to identify which
other factors may explain declining fertility. Soares and Falcao (2008) brie￿ y consider implications of
child mortality. Parents receive utility from surviving children and, as child mortality declines, so does
fertility. They note that lower child mortality increases the returns to parental investments in quality,
so that investments per child increase. In their framework the increase in parental investments per
child more than o⁄sets the decline in fertility, so that total time investments in children increase. Thus,
lower child mortality reduces MFLFP.
Miller (2008) and Doepke and Tertilt (2011) review the rather conclusive evidence that women
place relatively more weight than men on child expenditures and welfare-what might be termed ￿ child
quality.￿Shifts in income from husbands to wives tend to reduce expenditures on alcohol, tobacco, and
men￿ s clothing while increasing expenditures on children￿ s￿food and clothing. Evolutionary arguments
likewise suggest that men are relatively less concerned with quality of children than are women (cf.
Diamond (1997)). Miller (2008) points to the early twentieth century as a period in which female power
is rising, most spectacularly with passage of the 19th Amendment, rati￿ed in 1920, granting women
the vote. Miller presents evidence that as individual states, and then the nation, ceded the franchise to
women, this engendered passage of legislation increasing local public health spending which, in turn,
contributed to the decline in infant and child mortality. Doepke and Tertilt (2009) suggest that greater
power for females can lead to more resources for schooling. They develop a framework in which men
9granted the franchise to women in response to rising rates of return to human capital. These higher
returns meant that ceding power to females would increase the bargaining power of their daughters and
the education of their grandchildren. Cvereck (2007) argues that increased employment among single
females in the last decades of the nineteenth century increased their bargaining power within marriage.
The resulting increase in the share of marital output would rise as the gender wage gap narrows. Doepke
and Tertilit (2011) illustrate a noncooperative bargaining model in which a narrowing of the gender
wage gap can alter the mix of household public goods produced via household production functions.
In their framework, higher wages for wives make her time input more expensive and can reduce the
household supply of time-intensive public goods such as children even in the absence of a change in
preferences. Chiappori (1992) considers a cooperative marriage bargaining model. In his framework,
husbands and wives have di⁄erent preferences for household public goods (such as quantity and quality
of children). As wive￿ s bargaining power increases, there is increased weight given to her preferences.
Collectively, this literature points to an increase in the relative power of females circa 1900 which led
to increased investment in the quality and well-being of children. Since greater investments per child
imply children who are more expensive, fertility may be expected to fall.
Our research builds on the foregoing research in a variety of ways. Below we present a model of two-
parent households in which fertility, child labor and human capital, and degree of married female labor
force participation are endogenous. This framework is calibrated to the United States between the Civil
War and WWII using a wide range of information, including changes in the gender wage gap, returns
to schooling, levels of human capital inputs, and infant and child mortality. The model￿ s ￿ exibility and
careful calibration allow us to assess many of the explanations for family change considered above.
4 Modeling the household
4.1 Determinants of Human Capital
For each generation of adults there are four determinants of adult human capital; schooling, experience,
unskilled labor, and gender. The human capital of an adult male in period t is [h0mt + b ht]Emt
while that of a female is [h0ft + b ht]Eft: Here, ^ ht is the number of units of schooling human capital
bequeathed by the parents of t ￿ 1 to their children and is assumed to be equal across males and
females. h0ft(h0mt) is the stock of ￿ unimproved￿human capital associated with nature￿ s endowment,
learning by doing/observation prior to market work, and any minimum legal or cultural requirements
of parents regarding food, attention and training of their children. Thus, it is the ￿ no-schooling￿stock
of human capital. In general, the greater physical strength of males means that h0mt > h0ft, although
as argued by Galor and Weil (1996) the market premium to this strength di⁄erential has declined
10over time.3 Emt(Eft) indicates how schooling and unskilled human capital are augmented by work
experience.
The potential earnings of males and females are determined by the market valuation of their stocks
of human capital. The market values units of unskilled human capital and units of skilled human
capital equally whether provided by males or females. That is, gender earnings di⁄erences depend
upon di⁄erences in the stocks of human capital by gender and di⁄erences in time worked in the market
rather than discrimination. It is standard to view each e¢ ciency unit of human capital as being valued
at some constant rate per unit, say wt. However, market conditions may lead to circumstances in which
higher and lower levels of human capital are valued di⁄erently. Goldin and Katz (2008) regard this as
an interaction between changes in the supply of skill by households and the demand for skill by ￿rms.
To accommodate this possibility, units of unskilled human capital are paid at rate wt while units of
skilled or schooling human capital are rewarded at rate b wt. In particular, when skill-biased technical
change (and thus ￿rm demand for skill) proceeds more rapidly than skill supply, b wt is increasing in the
stock of schooling capital. This is captured by
c wt = wtb h￿
t:






b htEmt = wt
h




where hmt has scaled the schooling human capital by its market premium over unskilled human capital
so as to enable valuation of each unit by wt. Similarly, the potential adult female earnings are
(4.1.2) wt
h




Combining (4.1.1) and (4.1.2) yields the potential household earnings
wt(hft + hmt) = wtht:
If the ￿ race￿between skill and technology just o⁄set one the other, " = 0 and hmt and hft are simply
the (unscaled) human capital of males and females (while ht is the sum of adult human capital in the









Hence, the gender wage gap is
(4.1.3) 1 ￿ ￿t:
3This could be modeled either as a reduction in the price of male unskilled human capital, or as done here, a reduction
in the units viewed by the market.
114.2 Production of Schooling Human Capital
Schooling human capital is acquired during dependency and deployed during adulthood. Parents of
generation t ￿ 1 choose the quality of education, the goods inputs such as teachers and books, xt, the
quantity of their children￿ s education-fraction of youth devoted to schooling st. They also choose the
time spent on human-capital enhancing activities by mother et, the e⁄ectiveness of which depends on
the mother￿ s human capital hft. Thus, the schooling human capital produced, and which children can
deploy as adults in t + 1 is given by




















he 2 (0;1) are production function parameters (elasticities).
4.2.1 Preferences
Parents are assumed to care about the number of children surviving to adulthood nt+1 (half of whom
are boys), the earnings in adulthood of those children, and the consumption of household produced
goods. These sentiments are embodied in the utility function Ut for parents beginning adulthood in t
(4.2.2)








where Gt is the consumption of household production goods.
Potential earnings of children in adulthood derive from two sources. The third term is the earnings
across all surviving children derived from unschooled (or unskilled) human capital. Parent￿ s relative
taste for these ￿ unimproved￿earnings is ￿t; such earnings may be increased by choosing to have a larger
number of surviving children nt+1. The aggregate earnings of adult children associated with schooling
human capital is given by the second term. The relative preference for such earnings is captured by
 t , and these earnings may be increased by having more surviving children nt+1 and by investing
more in their education (which increases ^ h1+"
t+1). In the description of the budget set below, it is seen
that all surviving children impose costs, and that such costs are not a matter of choice. All surviving
children also confer ￿ nature￿ s bounty￿of the unimproved human capital. Bequeathing schooling human
capital to children imposes additional costs, and these costs are only voluntarily undertaken.4 In
general, parents may place unequal valuations on earnings potential by source.5 Andreoni (1990) in an
in￿ uential paper argues that altruists get a ￿ warm glow￿from their own contributions to a recipient,
4The costs of unimproved earnings may include some expenditures on mandatory schooling; the key feature is that
these costs are not subject to choice.
5As noted in the literature review, there is evidence that men and women have di⁄erent preferences over fertility and
quality; this speci￿cation allows us to analyze implications of those di⁄erences.
12and therefore place a di⁄erent valuations on own contributions than to other sources (here unimproved
earnings from ￿ nature￿ ) of a recipient￿ s well-being. Both  t and ￿t embody a taste for quantity of
children. However, only  t re￿ ects a taste for improving the quality (i.e., schooling) of individual
children. For this reason an increase in  t=￿t is viewed as an increased relative preference for quality
of children over quantity of children.
The second, or schooling, term assumes parents have some assumption about the outcome of the
￿ supply-demand￿of skills race as re￿ ected in the term (1 + "). ^ h1+"









t ; ￿s = ￿p
s(1 + "); ￿x = ￿p
x(1 + "); ￿he = ￿he(1 + ￿):
With logarithmic preferences, the utility function is strictly quasi-concave and monotonically in-
creasing in each argument. Parental choices are made over Gt; nt+1 and ^ h1+"
t+1; and are constrained in
various ways, which we now explain.
4.3 Constraints
All adults marry for life upon reaching adulthood and make all decisions for the household￿ s remaining
life at the beginning of adulthood. Fathers work full-time. Mothers allocate time in their adulthood
among household production, market work, and children. The market earnings of fathers, mothers, and
older children are spent on family consumption and developmental inputs for young and older children.
By accounting for these uses of time and goods we develop below an overall budget constraint for the
family.
4.3.1 The life cycle and time use
Period and Mortality Structure Childhood is spent under the direction and care of parents.
Childhood lasts one period and parents die as children reach adulthood. Not all live births result in
a child who survives to adulthood. The number of live births required to produce 1 child surviving
to adulthood equals d1: d1 exceeds one for two reasons. First, some children die within the ￿rst year
of life (infant mortality). Indeed, a signi￿cant portion of all infant mortality is neonatal, occurring in
the ￿rst weeks of life. (Some other conceptions are carried nearly to term and naturally aborted late,
or perhaps still-born). Second, some children who survive infancy also die before reaching adulthood.
d1 re￿ ects both types of mortality, so that as either declines so will d1: d2 is the number of children
reaching age 1 that is required to produce 1 child reaching adulthood; d2 re￿ ects only youth mortality.
13Mother￿ s time allocation Mother￿ s devote time to household production, raising children and the
labor market. Each live birth demands ￿ ￿t units of mother￿ s time on children to activities largely
unrelated to the child￿ s quality, whether the child survives infancy or not. Even deaths occurring
within the ￿rst year of life impose large costs for mother in terms of lost productivity during pregnancy,
recovery following delivery, time to nurse and tend while the infant survives, and grieving costs upon
the infant￿ s demise. Each child surviving infancy imposes additional time costs of ￿t on mother during
its dependency largely unrelated to child quality. These include ￿ picking up￿after children, laundry,
dishwashing, etc. Since most such chores require little skill, we assume that the time required is
independent of the stock of mother￿ s human capital.
Mothers devote et units of time to the development of human capital in each young child. This
￿ quality￿time includes activities such as reading and talking to, and educational play with, the young
child. It also can re￿ ect, as in Mokyr (2000), time spent learning about and preparing safe and nutritious
foods, household cleaning directed at reducing the population of bacteria and viruses in the household,
or monitoring activities designed to protect the child from accidents. We suppose that the productivity
of mother￿ s time devoted to human capital increases linearly in her human capital.
zt units of time are allotted to household production in which market goods ct are combined with
mother￿ s time to produce household consumption goods Gt. These goods are consumed by parents
throughout their adult lives; Gt also includes any household public goods which are enjoyed by children
as well as parents.6 Mothers may also devote time to the labor market, mt (such time is not determined
by where it is performed ￿home/factory/o¢ ce/store ￿but by its pecuniary motivation). In combina-
tion, these uses of time are constrained by the 1 unit of time at mother￿ s disposal. Thus, mother￿ s time
use must satisfy
(4.3.1) nt+1 [d2(￿t + et) + d1￿ ￿t]hftwt + mt + zt = 1
Children￿ s time budget Dependency lasts one period. Each of the d2nt+1 children surviving infancy
has T < 1 units of productive time, since very young children cannot work at all and older children
lack the stamina and strength and concentration to work full time (cf. Lord and Rangazas, 2006).
Total time devoted to schooling st includes both some unproductive time of young children, as well as
that of older children. In early childhood all children are ￿ schooled￿for some minimum fraction ￿ st of
T. This schooling is exogenous and has no opportunity cost due to the young child￿ s lack of strength,
concentration, understanding, or learning by doing character. Parents decide how much time lt older,
potentially wage-earning, children should contribute to the household budget through market work and
6With logarithmic preferences mother￿ s time allocation proves independent of whether household productivity bene￿ts
from skilled labor; of course Gt and utility are higher when skills matter.
14how much time b st to spend in schooling. Hence, the time constraint faced by each child is given by
(4.3.2) b st + lt = T:
Sources and uses of money income In addition to goods used in household production there
are goods outlays on the quantity and quality of children. Parents spend d2￿twtht for each surviving
child on clothes, housing, and other child consumption items that tend to mechanically increase with
a family￿ s standard of living, yet have little e⁄ect on child quality (such goods are the numeraire).
Although we believe such expenditures to be common, they are little-treated in the literature.
Parents also spend money for children￿ s schooling or developmental inputs xt, each unit costing Pt.
Since the public ￿nancing of primary schooling was independent of usage even in the late 19th century,
the cost of all goods inputs (including books, educational toys and broadening vacations, etc.) is less
than one. For older children attending high school, developmental inputs were less subsidized. Total
goods expenditures across all children are therefore
(4.3.3) nt+1d2(Ptxt + wtht￿t):
Market earnings for a husband beginning adulthood in t are wthmt. The potential earnings of
the wife (i.e., should she devote all time to market labor) are wthft. Older children can work, but
are assumed to o⁄er only their unskilled human capital to the market while dependents. Due to less
strength and concentration as compared to adults, children earn only ￿wt per unit of unskilled human
capital, with ￿ 2 (0;1). These potential earnings are therefore d2￿wtnt+1h0tT, where h0t is average
unskilled human capital across males and females (h0mt + h0ft)=2.7 Actual earnings of children are
below potential earnings to the extent that older children spend time b st in school. Altogether potential
household money income is
(4.3.4) wtht + d2￿wtnt+1h0tT:
Combining the results from (4.3.1), (4.3.2), (4.3.3), and (4.3.4), the family￿ s overall budget constraint
is expressed as
wtht + d2￿wth0tTnt+1 = d2￿wh0tb stnt+1 + nt+1 [d2(￿t + et) + d1￿ ￿t]hftwt
+nt+1d2(Ptxt + wtht￿t) + ztwthft + gt (4.3.5)
The household￿ s potential labor income is given on the left-hand side. The right-hand side gives
the total spending on, respectively, the implicit costs of schooling older children, the implicit cost of
7Thus, young males earn h0mt=h0ft times the earnings of young females. The impact of early schooling on the earnings
of older children is emphasized in Lord and Rangazas (2006).
15mother￿ s time devoted to quality and quantity of children, the money outlays for kids education and
consumption, the implicit costs of mother￿ s time devoted to household production, the goods used in
household production.
4.4 Household production
We assume that household production is governed by the equation
(4.4.1) Gt = g￿
t (hftzt)
1￿￿ :
As speci￿ed, the productivity of the wife￿ s time in household production is increasing in her human
capital. This is certainly plausible, but below we see that mother￿ s optimal choice of household pro-
duction time zt is independent of hft. We have noted that fathers work full time in market-oriented
labor and that older children work when not in school. Of course, especially in the nineteenth century,
fathers and children were also engaged in household production. To the extent they work ￿ at home￿ ,
their labor e⁄orts are implicitly priced at their market wage with the cost included in gt. Consequently,
the model does not require us to distinguish where the work of children and fathers is performed or
whether work performed at home is for family consumption or sale to the market. Similarly, domestic
servants are hired inputs and are included in gt. As men and children leave the home, and as domes-
tic servants are released, intermediate market goods (for example, store-bought ￿ our and clothes, and
washing machines) become more important.
4.4.1 Optimization
Parents of generation t choose the quality and quantity of children, (xt; b st; et; nt+1) and their own
consumption ￿ utilizing zt and gt￿so as to maximize their utility function given by equation (4.2.2),
subject to constraints (4.3.1) and (4.3.5). Recalling that st = st + b s, the Lagrangian L is written,
L = lnGt +   lnwt+1bt(b st + st)￿sx￿x
t (hftet)
￿he (Emt + Emf)
nt+1
2





(d2￿wtnt+1h0t (T ￿ st) ￿ ztwthft ￿ nt+1 [d2(￿t + et) + d1￿ ￿t]hftwt ￿ gt)
+wtht ￿ nt+1d2(ptxt + wtht￿t)
￿
16The ￿rst order conditions (FOCs) for the optimal choices of gt; zt; xt; et; b st; & nt+1 are
v1=gt = ￿; (4.4.2)
(1 ￿ v1)=zt = ￿￿twthft; (4.4.3)
￿x =xt = ￿d2ptnt+1; (4.4.4)
￿he =et = ￿d2wthtnt+1; (4.4.5)
￿s =b st = ￿d2￿nt+1h0t; (4.4.6)
(  + ￿)=nt+1 = ￿([d2(￿t + et) + d1￿ ￿t]hftwt ￿ d2￿wth0 (T ￿ st)) (4.4.7)
+￿d2(ptxt + wtht￿t):
These FOCs reveal standard intuitions. Equations (4.4.4￿ 4.4.6) govern the demand for human
capital inputs. They all balance the left-hand-side marginal utility of accumulating human capital (and
therefore child earnings in adulthood) against the utility cost from foregone parental consumption of
doing so. Notice that in each equation this cost is increasing in fertility nt+1d2; so that as stressed by
Becker (1981) the price of children quality is increasing in the quantity of children. Further, in (4.4.4)
and (4.4.5) which govern the developmental inputs for perishable children, this price of quality per
surviving child is increasing in d2 since the higher is child mortality, the more children must be born in
order to produce a surviving one. The cost of mother￿ s and older children￿ s time inputs are increasing
in their respective wages. Similarly the goods input prices enter into their FOCs for goods. Equation
(4.4.7) governs the choice of number of surviving children. Notice that all human capital inputs enter
into the price side of this expression. So, in Becker￿ s symmetry, the price of child quantity is increasing
in its quality. Additionally, this price of quantity also increases in the various ￿xed costs associated
with each surviving child (both goods and time, for both young and older children). Solving the system
of optimality conditions above yields the explicit demand functions discussed below.
The quality and quantity of children Parental investments in child quality are given by youth
schooling inputs xt and b st and mother￿ s time devoted to children￿ s human capital production et. The
quantity of surviving children is nt+1 so that fertility (i.e., children ever born) is d1nt+1. These
investments are given by
(4.4.8) xt =











￿ i = s;x;he
(4.4.9) b st =











￿ ￿ s i = s;x;he
17(4.4.10) et =
























(1 +   + ￿)[d2ht￿t + hft (d2￿t + d1￿ ￿t) ￿ d2h0t￿T]
i = s;x;he
Notice ￿rst that the structure of these expressions is quite similar. Consider ￿rst the quality variables
xt; b st; and et. The numerators di⁄er in that each contains the exponent for that input, while for
the denominators each contains the price for that input. The common term inside the braces in the
numerator for each expression is the cost, net of potential bene￿ts, of an additional child surviving to
adulthood independent of quality (￿xed costs of child consumption and mother￿ s time inputs for quantity
minus potential child earnings). The common term inside the rounded brackets in the denominator
re￿ ects the cost of increasing quality (which is lower the higher are the returns to scale in human
capital production). Thus, an increase in the numerator relative to the denominator is associated with
a higher relative price per surviving child, and leads to an increase in the child quality variables. Notice,
also, that these common terms are ￿ ￿ ipped￿in the expression for surviving children, so that a higher
relative price per surviving child leads to a reduction in nt+1. These considerations are central to the
￿ quantity-quality￿trade-o⁄ (cf. Becker (1981)).
More particularly, notice that if the human capital of the male hmt and female hft increases by the
same percentage while unskilled human capital of children h0t is unchanged, there is an increase in the
net costs of quantity of children and an increase in the relative price of child quantity. Consequently,
there is a substitution away from quantity toward quality (xt;b st;et all increase and nt+1 falls). nt+1
falls as the net cost of children increases by a larger percentage than the family￿ s earnings endowment.
Lord and Rangazas (2006) obtain a similar result in terms of a declining opportunity cost of schooling
children (utility loss from forgone parental consumption) as parental earnings rise relative to potential
child earnings. Jones and Tertilt (2007) show that, empirically, fertility and income have varied inversely
since at least the middle of the nineteenth century in the United States. Since human capital has risen
over this time, and human capital increases income, this ￿nding is supportive of the model.
As noted, if hmt and hft rise in one period (with children￿ s unskilled human capital h0t unchanged),
there will be greater investments in children through xt;b st; and et. Ceteris paribus, then, hmt+1 and
hft+1will also increase, increasing xt+1; b st+1; and et+1and so on. Thus, as Lord and Rangazas (2006)
note, there is an important supply-side element associated with any initial rise in human capital which
carries forward into future generations. This e⁄ect becomes weaker through time, though, as hmt+1
and hft+1 rise relative to h0t+1.
18The choices over quantity and quality are also a⁄ected by expectations of infant and child mortality.
A reduction in infant mortality reduces d1 with no e⁄ect on d2. Since this reduces the number of
births entailing a cost of ￿t required to produce a surviving child, the cost of a surviving child falls.
Consequently, quantity of children is substituted for quality so that xt; b st; and et fall while nt+1 rises.
(cf. Doepke (2005) and Becker and Barro (1988)). The number of children ever born to a cohort, or
just fertility, is d1nt+1: Inspection of (4.4.11) reveals that there is an ambiguous e⁄ect of reduced infant
mortality on fertility. That is, even though the number of surviving children demanded has fallen, the
fact that fewer births are required to produce a surviving child makes the e⁄ect on births unclear.
A ceteris paribus reduction in d2 also reduces d1, but by a lower percentage. This would have an
ambiguous e⁄ect on the quality and quantity variables (although nt+1falls and xt; b st; et rise unless the
infant mortality rate is quite high-as it was through the mid-late nineteenth century). Now suppose
some percentage decline in youth mortality d2 is accompanied by a reduction in infant mortality such
that d1 falls by the same percentage. This would have no e⁄ect on any of the quality variables or on
the number of children surviving infancy d2nt+1: The quality variables are unchanged because their
prices per unit per surviving child are proportional to d2 (recall their F:0:C:0s), so that the increase in
the net cost of quantity is just o⁄set by an increase in the net cost of quality. That is, there would
be no change in the relative prices of quantity and quality. However, there is a decline in nt+1 equal
to 1 divided by the percentage decline in d1 and d2; but no change in fertility d1nt+1. In the current
framework, child quality variables are unlikely to rise as mortality falls. This di⁄ers from Soares and
Falcao (2008) who suggest child quality is likely to rise as mortality falls, as they put less emphasis on
the fact that falling mortality reduces the costs of quantity (as well as quality).
Notice that goods inputs xt increase with the wage per unit of human capital wt, whereas the other
quality variables b st and et do not. All components of the ￿ mechanical￿costs of quantity are all related
to human capital variables and so increase with wt. However, the price of the time inputs of mothers
in etand of children in b st is proportional to wt; thus, wt drops out of their solutions. However, the cost
per unit of xt is Pt. Consequently, wt remains and xt increases with wt=Pt.
Finally, notice that the solutions for the quality variables are increasing in ￿x;￿s; and ￿he. These
coe¢ cients, in turn, are increasing in the market premium to skill (i.e., ") which is expected by parents to
be operative during children￿ s adulthood. In the calibration section it is stressed that such expectations
are not necessarily accurate.
194.4.2 Mother￿ s time in household production:
Mothers￿time in household production is given by
(4.4.12) zt =
(1 ￿ v)(hft + hmt)
(1 +   + ￿)hft
:
Notice that if human capital of females hft increases by a larger percentage than that of males, then
the time mothers spend in household production zt falls. That is, a reduction in the gender wage gap
induces mothers to reduce time in household production, and increase time devoted to market work.
Intuitively, in the denominator, the more expensive is mother￿ s time input, the less of it is used in
household production. This is only partially o⁄set by a wealth e⁄ect (present in the numerator). Note,
though, that if hmt were to increase with no change in female human capital, the derived demand for
zt would increase (as in De Vries (2008)). Note that zt is independent of infant and youth mortality.
Market goods in household production: Goods inputs in household production are
(4.4.13) gt =
vwt(hmt + hft)
(1 +   + ￿)
This expression reveals that an increase in the household￿ s potential wage earnings, arising from any
combination of higher wages, or higher human capital for males or females, serves to increase the use
of market goods in household production.
Taking the ratio of (4.4.12) to (4.4.13) shows that an increase in the wife￿ s human capital reduces
the ratio of her time input to goods inputs, so that household production becomes more goods intensive
over time. The good￿ s intensiveness of household production also increases with increases in the wage
per unit of human capital, even if hft is constant. Recall that the time inputs of children and domestics
are valued at their wages and included in gt. We can infer that the increased expenditures on store-
bought goods inputs characterizing the second industrial revolution exceeded in magnitude the reduced
expenditures on child and domestic inputs.
The mother￿ s time constraint was given in (4.3.1). That equation shows that mother￿ s labor market
time increases with endogenous reductions in household production, child investment time, and the
number of surviving children; it also increases if the exogenous time costs of child quantity (￿t and ￿t )
fall over time. Calibration exercises reveal the relative importance of these di⁄erent sources of change
in market orientation.
5 Baseline calibration
This section examines the evidence used to specify the parameter values chosen to calibrate the initial
baseline. In some instances the time path of the parameters and of the calibration targets is also
20discussed; in other instances this is undertaken in the results section. Some aspects of the calibration
are complicated by a paucity of data, and in such instances we explain our attempts to overcome-if
imperfectly-the data limitations.
Human Capital
Stocks and ￿ ows of human capital are not directly observed, but may be inferred from information
on earnings, schooling investments and work experience. Given the data available, our approach to
calibrating human capital is, ￿rst, to utilize information on the gender wage gap and then, schooling
inputs.
Recall that the gender wage ratio is modeled as

















t allowed for the possibility that the wage per unit of schooling human capital was increasing
in the level of schooling human capital. The production function for human capital was given by














As discussed below, these speci￿cations for human capital along with available data enable us to pin
down some parameters, and to establish calibration targets for schooling human capital.
Narrowing of Gender Wage Gap Due to Changes in Experience
Goldin and Polachek (1987) ￿nd that the female to male ratio of earnings among full-time employees
across 6 occupations closed from :463 in 1890 to :556 in 1930, further narrowing to :603 by 1970. Most
of the narrowing occurred by the 1930s and Goldin (1990, p.62) notes this ratio in the economy as a
whole ￿was virtually stable from 1950 to around 1980.￿ 8 Supposing a cohort￿ s average wage ratio in
adulthood is the ratio when the cohort members are about age 40, the cohort born in 1850, becoming
parents in 1875, experienced the wage ratio ￿1890 = :46, while the cohort born in 1925, who would
become parents in 1950, experienced ￿1970 = :60. The cohort born in 1900, becoming parents in 1925,
might confront ￿1940 = :57 (given the slow increase between 1930 and 1970). We average ￿1890 and
￿1940 and set ￿1915 = :52 for the birth cohort of 1875 (who became parents in 1900).
8However, if the ratio is instead based on hourly earnings among full-time workers there is a further increase to .662
by 1970 as full-time men come to work longer hours than full-time women, especially after 1940.
21The reasons for this signi￿cant closing of the gap, and their relative importance, have been ex-
amined by Goldin (1986, 1990) and Goldin and Polachek (1987). They determine that changes in
the occupational distribution can explain only a modest portion of the narrowing; rather, most was
due to rising wages for females within occupational groupings, especially among clerical and profes-
sional employments.9 The limited importance of changes in the occupational distribution leads them
to examine the roles of changes in the quantities of education and experience, as well as the returns
to education and experience. The portion of the gap not explained by these characteristics is often
viewed as discrimination, although since measured as a residual, it may instead re￿ ect omitted factors
or mis-measurement of included factors. Goldin (1986, 1990) and Goldin and Polachek (1987) note
that especially in the early portion of this interval, much of the unexplained portion may be fairly
attributed to gender di⁄erentials in strength in an era when muscles had a high marginal product.
Our approach is to allow the narrowing of the gap to be a consequence of changes in work experience,
education, and returns to strength.10
Goldin and Polochek (1987, p. 147) ￿nd the role of education (including both changes in the rate
of return to education and level of education) in narrowing the gap is 50% more important than that
of experience, while speculating that a reduction in the premium to strength was at least as important
as that of experience. Supposing equal roles for experience and changes in the reward to strength, this
suggests they each explain 28-29% of the narrowing, with education then explaining about 43%.
Goldin and Polachek (1987) propose exact ￿gures for the e⁄ect of work experience on human
capital separately for males and females in both 1890 and 1970. These are, for males Em1890 =
2:53 and Em1970 = 2:01, and for females Ef1890 = 1:62 and Ef1970 = 1:41. The slight reduction for
females occurred even as the average experience among working women increased signi￿cantly. This
downward trend for males and females is consistent with the discussion in section 2 which noted that
over this period there was a substitution away from employer and industry speci￿c on-the-job-training
toward the acquisition of general human capital in schools. Thus, overall increases in human capital for
this period occurred only because schooling human capital rose by more than returns to experience fell.
The ratio Eft=Emt rose from :64 to :70, or by 9:37 percent between 1890 and 1970. Ceteris paribus,
this increases the gender wage ratio to :463(1:0937) = :506, or by :043: Of the total increase in the
gender wage ratio, :603￿:463 = :14, this relative increase in returns to experience explains about 30%.
Schooling Human Capital and the Premium to Male Strength
9Goldin and Polachek (1987, Table 1) report that holding wages constant at their 1890 level but applying them to the
1930 occupational distribution only narrows the gap by 2.6 of the almost 10 point increase between 1890 and 1930.
10They ￿nd that the unexplained portion of the gap remained roughly constant between the 1930s and 1970. Goldin
(1990) argues that discrimination seems to emerge after 1940, especially in the clerical sector. Consequently, as the gender
gap has narrowed over time, the relative importance of discrimination has increased.
22Considering the expression for the wage ratio (5.0.14), we set unskilled human capital for males form-









This then identi￿es a locus of values for unskilled female human capital and e⁄ective schooling human
capital given by
h0f1875 = 7:23 ￿ :277^ h1+"
1875.
Information on the level of schooling and returns to schooling help establish a range of values for ^ h1+"
1875.
Murphy, Simon and Tamura (2008) report that, nationally, the average years of schooling for the birth
cohort of 1850 was 3.35 years. This suggests a value for
^ h1+"
1875 = (1 + rh)3:35;
where rh is the rate of return to a year of schooling.
Since the U.S. Census did not begin collecting information on educational attainment until 1940,
there is no direct national evidence on the rate of return to education for the 1850 birth cohort. However,
Goldin and Katz (2008, Table 2.5, 78-9) present microeconomic evidence on the returns to schooling
among males 18-65 based on a 1915 Iowa state census. The returns to those younger than 35 are also
reported separately, enabling us to infer the returns to those age 35 and older. Slightly more than half
of the males in that sample are older than 35. The returns for this 35-65 group help establish a range
of plausible returns for the 1850 birth cohort -the mid-point of ages 35 and 65 is 50, and someone aged
50 in 1915 would have been born in 1865. This approach yields an estimate of 3:73% for each year of
common school and of 6:23% for each year of high school; few men in this age grouping would have had
many years of high school. Interestingly, the returns for this period were increasing with educational
attainment. (The returns for those 18-34 were 4:83% for common school and 12:0% for high school).
It seems unlikely that returns would have been much higher for the median southern household, even
though the skill premium was somewhat higher in the South (cf Wright (1986)). The foregoing suggests
an estimate for rh of perhaps 4%.
Other considerations suggest a somewhat higher rate may be warranted. In Iowa, almost all healthy
men were literate by this date, so attainment of basic literacy must not have much di⁄ered by years of
education, even though average years were low. Further, there was a signi￿cant premium to literacy.
Indeed, at the turn of the century Goldin (1900, p. 100) ￿nds in a sample of manufacturing women that,
holding education constant, the return to literacy was 14%. If men with but two years of education,
say, were literate, an estimate for rh exceeding 4% may be warranted. Also, state-level estimates of the
23rate of return to an additional year of education (not based on micro data) for this period are higher,
about 10% (Murphy, Simon, and Tamura (2008)). We decided to also consider a second baseline,
associated with rh = 7%: Consequently, there are two initial values for
^ h1+"
1875 = (1 + rh)3:35;
namely: 1:14 and 1:26.
The two resulting values for females unskilled human capital h0f1875 = 7:23 ￿ :277^ h1+"
1875 are 6:52
and 6:84 (as compared to h0m1875 = 10). These ￿gures imply a premium to strength for males for the
initial period of about 50%, which seems reasonable. For example, Goldin and Polachek (187, 147) note
that ￿data on piece-rate earnings in 1895 indicate that males earned on average 30 percent more than
did females (i.e., the wage ratio was :77), when the piece rate was identical for both, and when both
worked at the same job, in the same factory.￿They point out that this constitutes a lower-bound on
the reward to greater male strength since it was only in those occupations where physical di⁄erences
were less important that men and women worked together. And, in 1875 the premium was presumably
greater than in 1895.
Changes in Schooling human Capital and Premium to Strength
In each of the two baselines, increases in education are targeted to contribute roughly 43% of the
narrowing of the gender wage gap from :463 to :603 by 1970. Thus, schooling human capital alone must
raise the wage ratio to :463 + (:43)(:603 ￿ :463) = :523: The required value for the cohort born in 1925
(forming households in 1950) is ^ h1+"
1950 ; it is obtained from
"
h0f1875 + ^ h1+"
1950




Thus, in the low returns case, where rh = :04; ^ h1+"
1875 = 1:4; and h0f1875 = 6:84, ^ h1+"
1950 = 7:27: This makes
the (e⁄ective) schooling human capital of the 1925 birth cohort, compared to the 1850 birth cohort,
equal to ^ h1+"
1950=^ h1+"
1875 = 7:27=1:4 = 5:2; that is, (e⁄ective) schooling human capital must increase a little
more than 5-fold in this case to generate the postulated narrowing of the gender gap associated with
education. In the high returns case the increase is from 2:6 to 9:0, so that schooling human capital rises
by a multiple of 3:46.
Finally, the premium to men￿ s strength was declining, enough to raise the wage ratio by 28% of the






24Thus, h0m1950 = 9:11 in the low returns case (and 9:0 in the high returns case). That is, we ￿nd that
for the 1925 birth cohort there remains a premium to male strength of about 35%: That a signi￿cant
premium to strength remained at this time is con￿rmed by Rendall (2010), who ￿nds that 83% of the
more recent narrowing of the wage ratio from 1980 to 2005 (from about :60 to :77) is explained by a
declining premium to male strength.
Human Capital Productivity Parameters, Inputs, and Role of Curriculum
I. Returns to scale in human capital production
We next ask whether the observed increases in schooling inputs might be consistent with the in-
creases in b h1+" suggested above. To address this requires i) measures of the schooling inputs for the
1850 and 1925 birth cohorts, and ii) values for the exponents in the human capital production function
(5.0.15).
The exponent on an input in the human capital production function is its elasticity of human capital
with respect to the input. All empirical evidence indicates that the time (or quantity of school) margin
st is appreciably more productive than are schooling inputs such as teachers or books, the xt, which
re￿ ect school quality.(cf. Lord and Rangazas (1993) and Browning, Hansen, and Heckman, (1999)).
A consensus estimate for goods is ￿p
x = :10; perhaps somewhat lower in recent times and possibly
somewhat higher in earlier periods. This value has also been employed for the e⁄ect of mother￿ s time
input hftet and we set ￿
p
he = :10 as well. A broader range of values has been estimated for ￿p
s with most
falling between .5 and .7. We employ a compromise value of ￿p
s = :6 (see Lord (1989) and Browning,




he = :8 are therefore the returns to
scale in human capital production.
II. Schooling Inputs: Expenditures
This section presents evidence on school expenditures and on school attendance over the period.
These are then used to assess the increase in human capital, given the elasticities of human capital
with respect to inputs discussed above while holding constant the e¢ ciency of human capital inputs.
Next, any shortfall in schooling human capital derived from observed inputs- relative to the targets
determined in the calibration above- is allocated to increases in the e¢ ciency scalar b in human capital
production (i.e., multifactor productivity in human capital production).
Table A1 depicts the time path of schooling expenditures. Column (1) indicates the year of the
expenditures. Column (2) provides the expenditures per pupil enrolled in public primary and secondary
schools in 1982-1984 constant dollars.11 Column (3) is the school enrollment rate (public and private)
11Table Bc909-925 Public elementary and secondary school expenditures from Historical Statistics of the United States,
Millennial Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press. Volume 2, contributed by Claudia Goldin.
25of those aged 5-19, including post-secondary.12 The product of columns (2) and (3) yields column
(4), expenditures per population member aged 5-19.13 Column (5) is the ratio of expenditures per
pupil enrolled in some year compared to that in 1870; column (6) is the ratio of expenditures per 5-19
population member in some year to those in 1865. Rangazas (2002, Table 1, p. 935) reports that the
share of GDP devoted to primary and secondary education rises from 1.0 percent in 1880 to 2.4% in
1940. In the initial baseline it is envisioned that the ratio of schooling expenditures to father￿ s life
earnings is about .7. Since our ￿gures include college expenditures for 1940, the targeted share is 2.6%
for that year.
III. Time in School
Table A2 provides information about time spent in school by children aged 5-19 in various years.
Column (1) indicates the school year. Column (2) is the average days attended per enrolled public
school student. Column (3) is the percent of the 5-19 year old population enrolled in school (public
and private, includes college enrollment). The product of columns (2) and (3) yields column (4) the
days attended per member of 5-19 population (assuming days attended are equal for private and public
students). The fraction of days in a year attended are then provided in column (5). The time spent
in school per member of the 5-19 population triples between the 1870 and 1940 school years. Suppose
we envision that schooling time of a member of a given birth cohort may be proxied by the column
(5) fraction corresponding to when birth cohort members are aged 15. Then, for example, members
of the birth cohort of 1925 (viewed in 1940) devote 30.9% of their time endowment to school. For
the 1900 birth cohort we average the ￿gures from 1910 and 1920 to get 20.2%; the ￿gure for the 1875
birth cohort is then 12.9%. This approach would require an unavailable 1865 ￿gure for the 1850 birth
cohort. Unfortunately, simply linearly (or geometrically) interpolating patchwork using the 1870 and
1880 ￿gures may be problematic due to the disruption in schooling among whites during the Civil War
and the illegality of schooling for black slaves prior to emancipation. The following motivates our choice
of values for that birth cohort.
Murphy, Simon and Tamura (2008, Table 8) provide years of education completed by birth cohort.
12Table CG.A.15 School enrollment of 5- to 19-year-olds per 100 persons, by sex and race: 1850 to 1994; Goldin (1999)
￿A Brief History of Education in the United States￿ . Percentage includes attendance at public and private schools and
also home schooling (so long as deemed comparable to regular schooling and led to a degree).
13This requires the reasonable assumption that expenditures per public and private student are roughly equal. For 1940,
college expenditures among those 18 and 19 are added to the total to make comparable to the student attendance data
discussed below. This adds about 10% to the 1940 total: Current expenditures per public elementary and secondary school
pupil in average daily attendance in 1941 was $675 in 1982-1984 dollars. Call this expenditures per enrolled student. See
HSUS Bc924.p 2-482. The comparable ￿gure is $2503 for 1941 in 1982-1984 dollars for enrolled undergraduate students-
educational and geneneral expenditures per student (HSUS table Bc966). Thus, the ratio of college to elementary and
secondary students is 3.71. About 20% of the 1925 birth cohort ever enrolled in college, whereas about 8% graduated.
We assume the enrollment rate averages about 15% for 18-19 year olds. Two years of college are added onto that from
K-12. So, (2/15)(2503)(.16)= 53.4; this increases expenditures for 1940 to 463+53=516.
26For the 1850 birth cohort this is 3.35 years; for the 1875 birth cohort this has risen to 4.75 years. As
discussed above, there is evidence that the rate of return to schooling at moderate levels of education
was low but increasing over this period. Assume the rate of return to education was 5% for the earlier
period and 5:5 percent for the later period. This then implies that the average worker in the 1850
cohort would earn (1:05)3:35 = 1:18 times that of someone with no education, whereas a member of the
1875 birth cohort would earn some (1:055)4:75 = 1:29 times that of someone with no education. This
implies an increase in the stock of human capital of about 1:29=1:18 or 9:3 percent among those with
no experience. Among males this would imply an increase in (e⁄ective) schooling capital of :29=:18 or
a little more than 50%. Thus, the e¢ ciency parameter b1875 in the human capital production function
for children of the 1850 birth cohort (born in 1875 with human capital based on 1890 schooling inputs)
is set to produce a value for b h1+"
1875 50% or so above the b h1+"
1850 level.
Empirical increase in b h with implications for increase in b
Below we assess the increase in schooling human capital associated with the time path of goods
and time inputs in Tables A.1 and A.2 shown in the appendix, and the production function parameters
previously discussed.14 It remains to pin down the goods and time inputs for the 1850 birth cohort (i.e.,
those input values in 1865) which are necessary to that calculation. To ￿nd them, we ￿rst considered
the increase in average schooling between the birth cohort of 1850 and that of 1875. Then rates of
return to education from Goldin and Katz (2008) were applied to that increase in schooling to obtain
the increase in total human capital (assuming unchanged returns to experience), which enables us
to infer the increase in schooling human capital. Once found, we allowed for a 10% improvement in
schooling productivity (the b e¢ ciency scalar) over that period. We found then that to achieve the
human capital of the 1875 birth cohort, the human capital inputs for 1870 needed to be reduced by
about 13% to yield the appropriate 1865 value. The share of time devoted to school increases from 8.5%
for the 1850 birth cohort to 30.8 percent for the 1925 birth cohort. These ￿gures are comparable to
those produced by Rangazas (2002, Table 2, p. 936).
Using the inputs from the tables discussed above (including the 1865 adjustments to 1870 values);
the assumed human capital production elasticities for inputs; and an assumed 50% increase in mom￿ s
human capital between those born in 1850 and 1925, we ￿nd schooling human capital for the birth cohort
of 1925 which is 3:1 times that of the 1850 birth cohort. Recall, though, the increase in schooling human
capital necessary to account for 43% of the narrowing of the gender wage ratio was by a factor of 5.2
in the rh = 4% case, and of 3.46 in the rh = 7% case. The gap between the increase in schooling
14This calculation will also assume that 1) mother￿ s human capital rises 50% between 1875 and 1925 (similar to what
our preferred calibrations produce). It is also assumed that there is no change in mother￿ s time input in terms of quality
per child as mother￿ s input is assumed constant in the ￿rst sets of experiments.
27human capital based on observed inputs and that required to appropriately narrow the gender wage
ratio in our framework then is associated with an increase in the e¢ ciency parameter in human capital
production bp: In the ￿ 4%￿case the required increase in e¢ ciency is 67:7% (i:e:;(3:1)(1:67) = 5:2) and
of 11:6% in the high case.
Cohort Income Change and the Wage Per Unit of Human Capital
In our framework, the human capital of husbands and wives is known when the household is formed
(since it depends on the choices of their parents and the exogenous returns to experience). Further,
mother￿ s market time does not depend upon her wage (see the model). Consequently, knowledge of the
wage earnings of a household in a period wtht enables one to solve for the wage per unit of human capital
wt. However, the U.S. Census did not include a question on earnings until 1940. Thus, household
income must be estimated indirectly.
Our approach to estimating the life earnings of a male beginning parenthood in year t begins with
several years of the national average income per worker covering the working years of adult employment
for that male. These are augmented with exogenous information on the gender wage gap, and the
proportion female within the workforce. In particular, the life cycle or permanent wage earnings of a
male beginning adulthood in t are:
ym;t =
X
yw;i=(Lm;i + ￿i(1 ￿ Lm;i);
where yw;i is output or income per worker in year i, Lm;i is the share of males in the labor force in
i; and ￿i is the gender wage gap confronted by the wives of those males. The yw;i are for those years
when the male would be age 30, 40 and 50 (or 25, 35, 45, and 55 if adulthood begins in a non-Census
year, see Table 1 below).15
15Household income would be given by
yt = wt[h0fef;tmt + h0m;tem;t] + wtb h
￿t+1
t [ef;tmt + em;t];
where mt is the portion of time the wife devotes to market-oriented work.
28Table1: Calculation of Life Cycle Permanent Income Per Full-time Male
Birth yr. yw
￿ Lm;i
￿￿ ￿ (Lm;i + ￿i(1 ￿ Lm;i) ym;t+1 ym;t+1=ym;1890
1850 7.56(1) .832(4) .463 .91 8.33 1.00
1875 9.66(2) .794(5) .52 .107 10 .71 1.29
1900 13.79(3) .754 .58 .143 15.33 1.84
￿Real output per worker in thousands of year 2000 dollars is from Murphy, Simon, and
Tamura (2008), Table1. All ￿gures are adjusted by labor￿ s share of GDP, assumed constant at 70%
throughout the period. ￿￿The male share of the labor force is from Historical Statistics of the United States:
Table Ba417-424 - Labor force participation, by sex and race: 1850-1990.
(1) average of 1880, 1890, and 1900; (2) average of 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930; (3) average of 1930,
1940 and 1950; (4) average of 1880 and 1900; (5) average of 1910 and 1920.
This income per adult male ym;t can be expressed in terms of the wage per unit of (unskilled) human
capital wt and his human capital using
ym;t = wth0m;tEm;t + b wtb htEm;t = wt
h




recalling that b wt = wtb h"
t+1, with " > 0 in periods when the wage per unit of human capital is increasing
in the level of schooling human capital. Once wt is known, the choice variables of t may be solved for.
Knowledge of the choice variables xt and st allows calculation of b ht+1, and the procedure is repeated
for the next cohort. The only remaining barrier to determining wt is to pin down the " for each period
t.
Gold and Katz (2008) emphasize that so long as di⁄erent skill levels are imperfectly substitutable,
the relationship between ￿ units of human capital￿and earnings among full-time workers is not in general
linear, but instead depends upon supply and demand conditions within the skill class. The demand for
skilled labor re￿ ects the pace of skill-biased technical change (SBTC), while school enrollment patterns
dominate the supply. In this framework, the wage premium to skill (and therefore earnings inequality)
are determined by a ￿ race￿between the demand for and supply of skill.
For the calibration we ￿rst determine which periods were a⁄ected by increasing wage per unit of
human capital (i.e., " > 0), and then consider the magnitude of ". We must further consider whether
parents would have expected " > 0 for their children and whether, in children￿ s adulthood, the expected
skill premium materialized. Expectations of skill premia, "e > 0; in￿ uence the parents￿choice of human
capital inputs, whereas the actual premia, "a;if any, in￿ uence the value for wt for those children in
adulthood. Goldin and Katz conclude, ￿(w)e do not know precisely when in the nineteenth century
the premium to schooling increased and whether it was as high even in 1850, but we do know that
by 1900 a year of high school or college was a very good investment (2008 , p. 288).￿It seems the
29premium to skill was rising in the latter portion of the nineteenth century, and we assume the parents
of 1875 expected their o⁄spring would bene￿t from a greater wage premium and that, in fact, those
assumptions were ex post correct. It also seems reasonable to expect that parents of 1900 would have
expected " > 0. However, ￿(t)he returns to a year of schooling plummeted from 1915 to the early
1950s. But the returns to schooling were so high prior to the narrowing that even after the decline
in the wage premium education remained a very good investment (Goldin and Katz (2008), p. 289).￿
Unfortunately, the expectations of an exceptional wage premium were not realized by their children,
whose working years were centered in the 1920s-1950s. Those becoming parents in 1925 are assumed
not to have expected " > 0 and their children are assumed not to have experienced " > 0.
What is the magnitude of " expected by the parents of 1875 and 1900 (and experienced by the
children born circa 1875)? Goldin and Katz provide evidence of the decline in the skill premium
following the onset of the high school movement around 1915. For example, among females (males) in
1895 the ratio of earnings of clerical workers compared to production workers was 1:94(1:69); by 1919
this ratio had declined to 1:52(1:20). Assume that the 1919 premium is that arising when the wage per
unit of human capital is linear in human capital (i.e., " = 0). This implies that b w1900 = wb h1+"e
1900 must
allow for a ratio of skilled to unskilled workers at the turn of the century which is roughly a third more
than that just a generation later. Supposing that skilled workers received 3-4 times as many schooling
inputs as unskilled workers, a value of " = :20 for 1895 (and " = 0 for 1919) plausibly produces the
premium.16
Market-Oriented Work of Wives
White wives seldom worked outside the home in the late 19th century. However, by the 1920s
a signi￿cant proportion of new brides would-with interruptions-devote many years of adulthood to
market labor. Life cycle participation rates for white married females of di⁄erent birth cohorts attaining
adulthood between 1880 and 1940 are derived from Roberts￿(2007, Fig. 1.9); the participation rates
for each age bracket are added, with the total then divided by the number of age brackets (see also
Goldin (1990, Ch. 2)). These ￿gures are derived from Census data and are presented in Table 2 below
as the LCPR.
16Consider a female in the rh = 7% case, with unskilled labor of 6.5 and schooling human capital of 2.6. Imagine a
composite input with returns to scale of .8. If unskilled workers receive 30% of the schooling inputs that a skilled worker
does, then the ratio of skilled to unskilled is about 1.5 (similar to 1919). If, instead, " = :2 so that the composite input
has an e⁄ective exponent of (1.2)(.8) =.96, the ratio of skilled to unskilled is about 1.8, similar to that in 1895.
30Table 2: Life Cycle Labor Force Participation Among White Married
1 2 3 4 5 6
Birth Cohort Attain Adulthood LCPR Adjustment ALCPR AVG
1855-64 1880 2.5 9.8 9.2 5.85
1865-74 1890 3.5 9.9 10.2 6.85
1875-84 1900 4.4 8.7 9.8 7.1
1885-94 1910 6.8 6.4 9.9 8.35
1895-04 1920 11.8 6.4 13.6 12.7
1905-14 1930 21.0 3.2￿ 18.1 19.55
1911-21 1940 28.7 0.0 21.2 24.95
1921-31 1950 36.1 0.0 27.0 31.55
1931-40 1960 41.3 0.0 31.0 36.15
* There is no adjustment measure for 1930, the last census year before the modern concept.
We assume one-half of the adjustment for 1920 applies to 1930. (Hist. Stat. U.S. for 1940
on, I-702, extrapolated for 60-69 for 1960 adulthood cohort). Averages are computed
across age groups of 20-29,..., 60-69. Column 5 is (.75) times the sum of columns 3 and 4.
(Also, see text for more details). Column 6 is the average between columns 3 and 5.
A potential di¢ culty is that, before 1940, Census questions di⁄ered appreciably from the modern
participation concept.17 In particular, prior to 1940, the question was that of one￿ s ￿ gainful occupation￿
(though the question varied a bit from Census to Census). Goldin (1990) notes that many women
in the nineteenth century engaged in market-oriented work on their husband￿ s farm or kept boarders;
under the modern conception of labor force participation they would be counted as in the labor force.
However, many viewed themselves as principally housewives, and reported this ￿ occupation￿to Census
takers. Goldin examines the extent of the underestimate for 1890, ￿nding the Census measure needed to
be revised upwards by almost 10 percentage points (roughly increasing the white MFLFPR for 1890 by a
factor of 5 compared to the Census). Sobek (1997, Table 2.5) replicates Goldin￿ s methodology to extend
the ￿ndings for 1880, 1900, 1910 and 1920.18 He ￿nds that adjusted MFLFPRs were relatively stable
over this entire period, followed by a rapid acceleration post-1940. These cross-section adjustments are
in Column 4. They are added to the LCPRs, then multiplied by .75 to produce the adjusted life cycle
participation rates ALCPR in Table 2. The scaling down by .75 re￿ ects Goldin￿ s contention that wives
working from home worked only part-time, whereas most women working outside the home worked
full-time through about 1940. Another possibility is to consider the simple average of the LCPR and
the ALCPR; this is provided in column 6 as AVG. The LCPR increases 8 fold between the 1855-64
and 1905-14 birth cohorts. In contrast, participation doubles for those cohorts using the ALCPR and
somewhat more than triples using the AVG concept. All measures are increasing over time because
young wives entering the labor force in the 1920s, began to re-enter the labor force in greater numbers
once their children matured.
17Beginning in 1940 the Census tabulates as ￿ in the labor force￿respondents indicating they either worked for pay in the
past week, were temporarily away from work (on vacation, for example), or had engaged in job search over that period.
18He uses data from IPUMS-the Integrated Public Use Microsamples of the US census (cf. www.ipums.umn.edu)
31Regardless of which series one prefers, it may be inappropriate to suggest the calibrations could
reproduce them. On one hand, our model assumes plans made at the beginning of adulthood are imple-
mented. However, Goldin emphasizes that during the Great Depression marriage bars were extended to
numerous sectors of the economy, reducing the employment of married women (Goldin (1990, Ch. 6).
And, since work interruptions reduce the value of prior work experience upon re-entering the workforce,
participation may have remained lower even after marriage bars were eliminated in the 1940s.(19)(20)
In fact, the calibrated values fall well within the broad range of participation rates from Table 2.21
Mortality
In 1900 the infant mortality rate was 16:24%, while the mortality rate for those ages 1-19 was
3:23%. With about 19:5% of children ever born dying during dependency, about d1;1900 = 1:24 live
births were required to produce a child surviving dependency, while d2;1900 = 1:035. 22. By 1925 the
infant mortality rate had fallen to 7:54%, while the mortality rate for those aged 1 ￿ 19 was 1:03%.
Consequently, d1;1925 = 1:098 and d2;1900 = 1:014. Murphy, Simon and Tamura (2008, Tables 13-15)
report that infant mortality was 17:1% in 1880, with an additional 12% of births dying between ages
1-15. These ￿gures are used to produce d1;1875 = 1:47 and d2;1875 = 1:14.
Fertility Targets
The U.S. Census irregularly collected data on fertility in the ￿rst half of the 20th century. Jones
and Tertilt (2007) use these Census responses to estimate children ever born for earlier periods. For
19Conversely, Goldin (1990, pages 154-157) examines survey data from young women born between 1944 and 1954
regarding their expected future participation rates and ￿nds that when rates have increased rapidly young women have
underestimated their future participation. Less clear is 1) whether such underestimation occurred for the earlier cohorts
we consider and, 2) whether their parents-who in our model control the human capital investments in children- may have
better anticipated their daughters￿life cycle work.
20Another potential limitation of labor force participation data is that hours worked can vary appreciably across those
within the labor force at a point in time, as well as across time. This creates an additional complication since our framework
addresses the allocation of time to an activity, rather than participation in that activity. Goldin (1990), however, argues
that most workers outside the home worked full time until about 1940.
21Goldin (1990) stresses that there was considerable heterogenity among women regarding their labor market behavior.
While few (especially white) married women worked outside the home in the late nineteenth and early twenetieth centuries,
those currently employed tended to have signi￿cant persistence in the labor force, and those not working currently tended
to have not accumulated much work experience since marriage. Similarly, those without children worked more than
those with children. This heterogenity has declined over time. Although a model with multiple types of agents may be
preferred, there is insu¢ cient data for such a calibration since education was not gathered in the Census until 1940. Thus,
although we could determine the education of someone born in 1880-age 60 in 1940-and ascertain whether they worked
in 1940, we would not know their participation in earlier years. Goldin notes clerical workers were more likely to return
to work at older ages, and most working women were employed in factories or as domestics through 1900. Thus, using
1940 employment to discern the link between education and employment in 1910, say, would suggested a much stronger
positive relationship between work and education than had been true. Although there was signi￿cant heterogeneity, it
should not be overstated. For example, in a Women￿ s Bureau Survey from 1940, Goldin calculates that those between the
ages of 40-49 in 1939 (and thus born between 1880 and 1889) had 15.5 years of work experience if currently working, and
7.6 if not currently employed (Table 2.5, p. 31). Or, viewing fertility, among white married females aged 23-27 in 1900
who had not given birth to a child, the labor force participation rate was 4.1 percent; if she had given birth to 1 child the
rate was 2.1 percent (or 1.7 percent if she had given birth to 2 children at the time of the Census).
22Information on mortality by age since 1900 is available in the HSUS table Ab988-1047.
32the cohort born between 1851-1855, children ever born is 5.3 (based on responses in the 1900 Census).
For the birth cohorts of 1876-1880 (chosen to re￿ ect children born to parents setting up households in
1875), children ever born was 3.25 (based on responses in the 1940 census). For the birth cohort of
1901-1905, estimated from responses in the 1950 Census, fertility had fallen to 2.59.
Mother￿ s time allocation to child quantity
The calibration of mother￿ s time required per infant and per (older) child unrelated to child quality,
￿t and ￿t involves several steps. Ramey (2009) exploits time use surveys conducted in the 1920s to
estimate how housewives￿time spent in home production varied with the number and ages of children
in the ￿rst half of the twentieth century. She ￿nds that a woman with no children and at least some
high school spent 44 hours per week in home production. The presence of children increased mother￿ s
time in housework. The additional time required by a child decreased as the child matured: a child
under one year of age added 17 hours to the housewives￿work week. Indeed, Albanesi and Olivetti
(2007) estimate that breast feeding alone requires about 14 to 17 hours per week during the ￿rst year.
If the youngest child was between one and ￿ve years, Ramey ￿nds housewives spent almost seven extra
hours per week and if the child was between six and 15 years of age, the housewife spent an extra 2
hours per week. Thus, in 5 of the 19 years (ages 1-19), 7 hours per week are devoted per child; from
ages 6-19, that is in 14 of the 19 years of dependency beyond infancy, 2 hours per week are devoted to
children. Assuming this is all for quantity of children, ￿ = (5=19)(7=70) + (14=19)(2=70) = :048.
Albanesi and Olivetti (2007) estimate that early in the twentieth century episodes of incapacitation
of mother during pregnancy and/or following childbirth were more prevalent than today, with each
pregnancy, on average, associated with 4:5 unproductive months. All of the pre-pregnancy time loss
and some portion of the post-pregnancy time costs should be added to the Ramey ￿gures. We assume
incapacitation costs added an average of 7 weeks per pregnancy. Taking a full-time work week to be 70
hours, 7 weeks represent 490 hours, which divided by 52 weeks implies a little over 9 hours per week
should be added to the ￿rst year. Consequently, ￿ = (1=20)(26=70) = :018
In the baseline human capital calibration, these values are employed in each period. They are
allowed to fall moderately over time in the second and third experiments as described below.
Time available for teenagers to work
The optimal value of each human capital choice variable is decreasing in ￿h0tT, while the number
of surviving children is increasing in that term. These implications are immediately understandable
as ￿h0T is the earnings a child could contribute toward the family budget were there no schooling of
children old enough to work. The higher are these potential earnings the less expensive are children
of a given quality, increasing the attractiveness of additional children and increasing the relative price
33of child quality. These potential earnings may be foregone when time is devoted to school, explicitly
realized when children are employed outside the home in wage labor, or foregone when children are
engaged in the household production of Gt. When they do work at home their time is valued at the
market wage and this expense is re￿ ected in the goods cost of the household production good.
The direct monetary contributions of children were signi￿cant in the late 19th century, but had
become insigni￿cant by the middle of the twentieth century. Their earnings contributions declined
to a large degree because the high school movement increased the time older children devoted to
human capital accumulation ^ st: Exogenous to the framework are compulsory schooling and child labor
legislation (cf Goldin and Katz (2008), Puerta (2009), Doepke and Zilibotti (2005), Moehling (1999))
which may a⁄ect the time available for those impacted by the policy. However, children directly
impacted by such policy￿ those working more and attending school less￿ were concentrated at lower
levels of parental earnings (Goldin and Parsons, 1989). Consequently, the median household we address
may not have been much a⁄ected by work restrictions or compulsory schooling laws.23
The ratio of a child￿ s wage per unit of human capital to that of an adult male is assumed to be
constant at ￿ = :4: This estimate is consistent with the evidence of Goldin and Parsons (1989) upon
dividing the earnings per child of di⁄erent ages from 10-19 and gender by their probabilities of working,
and then averaging. In the calibrations, it is the change in the human capital of parents relative to
that of children (along with other parametric changes) which drives changes in schooling.
Other parameters
Parental expenditures on the goods inputs xt are independent of the price Pt: From equation (4.4.8)
if Pt is 10% lower, xt is 10% higher. Because of the expansion of public education, and in particular the
high school movement for the period in question, the price to parents of schooling inputs fell through
time. The precise rate at which it fell and the total extent of the fall are not known. As an initial
guess, we set P1890 = :8, as there remained some rate bills at higher ages, outlays for books and other
home inputs, and transportation costs. As the high school movement proceeds, Pt falls. It is initially
assumed that by 1940 Pt = :2, a reduction of 75%: Given that taste parameters are used to pin down
23Zelizer (1985) argues that as the economic contribution of children declined, there was a shift in the perception of
parents toward children; they became ￿ emotionally priceless,￿even if there were no longer economically signi￿cant bene￿ts
(and, of course, large costs). In her view, child labor as a source of household income became reprehensible. Children
could still have small jobs and chores, but only insofar as these help develop character and good work habits. Any
earnings would be retained by the children in order to develop the ability to manage money. As children worked less in
and out of the home, organized leisure increased. Boy and cub scouts, girl scouts and brownies, boys and girls clubs of
America, Demolay, Pop Warner (later pee wee) football, and American Legion baseball are signi￿cant examples of youth
organization which had their origins in the ￿rst decades of the twentieth century.
As potential parental earnings relative to potential child earnings become large, the positive e⁄ect of parental human
capital ht on mother￿ s time investments in early child education et and the negative e⁄ect of ht on fertility diminishes.
Additionally, the e⁄ect of any reduction in child mortality or ￿xed time costs per child ￿t or ￿ ￿t on all human capital choice
variables is either less negative or more positive the smaller is ￿h0T:
34the initial xt, the results would be essentially unchanged if the 75% reduction had instead occurred
from an initial price of :9 or :6. Further, in the calibration section we note implications of a smaller (or
larger) percentage change in this price over time.
Other parameters are ￿ free￿and used to pin down the initial baseline. In particular, the exponent
on mother￿ s time 1￿v in household production is set at :26 for 1875 in order to allow the time mothers
devote to market to match the 5.8% ￿gure suggested for the ￿rst period.24 There is little direct evidence
on the portion of parental income devoted to the private consumption goods of young and older children.
Modern estimates of the non-human capital outlays per child in 2006 for middle-income families are
around 6%.25 Supposing private consumption expenditures on children were a superior good in the
twentieth century, we set ￿1875 = :04 per child for the parents of 1875. The taste parameters   and ￿
are used to pin down initial schooling inputs and fertility.
6 Calibration results
The objective of the paper is to identify the mechanisms which best explain the facts of family transition
between the Civil War and WWII. Prior sections presented a model capable of addressing several central
mechanisms in the literature and established model parameters and calibration targets. The analysis
next considers implications for the time path of the model￿ s choice variables of changes in the model￿ s
parameters. The presentation proceeds in a series of nested experiments. Some parameters are common
to both the rh = 4% and rh = 7% cases for every experiment; these are displayed in Table 3. Other
parameters di⁄er only in their initial baseline value across experiments (such as the human capital
e¢ ciency parameter bp and the taste parameters   and ￿); still other parameters have di⁄erent time
pro￿les across experiments. Table 4 lists these parameters by case and experiment. The ￿rst experiment
assesses how well a ￿ pure human capital￿version of the model can match the observed time path of
fertility, human capital inputs, mother￿ s market-oriented time, and gender wage ratio, and the targeted
time part for human capital production. In this Human Capital Baseline Experiment, the time-varying
exogenous parameters are limited to those for experience for males Emt and females Eft, the price per
unit of the schooling goods input Pt; and income per adult male ym;t: The results of this experiment
are found in Tables 5 and 6.
IInsert Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 about hereJ
In this speci￿cation, the mortality parameters d1t;and d2t are set to 1; that is, every child born
24To maintain the desired intial market time for mother, this value is adjusted trivially across the di⁄erent experiments.
25This estimate by the United States Department of Agriculture is in undiscounted dollars and sub-
tracted from total outlays costs of healthcare, education and child care, and 2/3 of food. See
http://www.cnpp.usda.gov/Publications/CRC/crc2006.pdf
35survives to adulthood. Also, the time path of mother￿ s time cost of child quantity per child (￿t + ￿t) is
held constant across periods, as is the share of potential parental earnings devoted to child consumption
per child ￿t:The preference parameters regarding child quality  t and child quantity ￿t are also time
invariant. Finally, this experiment abstracts from a role for mother￿ s time in a⁄ecting the human capital
















In both cases for this experiment, and for the subsequent experiments, the desired initial baseline
is closely matched. The parents of 1875 choose about 5.3 births, fraction of children time devoted to
school about 12%, mom￿ s time devoted to the labor market around 5.8% and about 1.4% of fathers￿
lifetime earnings allotted to expenditures on the schooling goods input. Also, re￿ ecting the discussion
above, the e⁄ective schooling capital of the children of those becoming parents in 1875, h1+￿
1900; is set
about 50% above that for the parents. For parents in the rh = 4% case, h1+￿
1875 = 1:4; so target h1+￿
1900 to
be a bit above 2. In the rh = 7% case, h1+￿
1875 = 2:6 so target h1+￿
1900 to be about 4.
Human Capital Baseline Experiment
Schooling human capital does rise across the periods, fertility does fall, and the gender wage ratio
does increase. However, the changes in these variables are far less than necessary by the end of the
study. Consider the case where initial schooling capital is low b h1+" = 1:4 (i.e., when rh = 4%). With
the initial schooling human capital low, a large percentage increase was required to raise the gender
wage ratio su¢ ciently for the birth cohort of 1925; recall from the calibration discussion that the
required b h1+" = 7:27; or 5.2 times that of the 1850 birth cohort. In fact, in this case and experiment
b h1+" increases by only 157% (to 3.6), far below the targeted amount. Given that the model setup
emphasizes a quantity-quality trade-o⁄, it is perhaps unsurprising that the reduction in children ever
born, from 5.3 to 5.1, is too small as well (the target for parents beginning adulthood in 1925 is 2.6).
Children￿ s time devoted to school only increased about 13% as correspond to the actual increase of
about 200%. xt increases by a factor of 12, below the target of 16.5. Mother￿ s time devoted to market
roughly doubles. Table 6 shows the results are no better for the rh = 7% case.
The role of changes in the skill premium " proves to be modest. Consider the rh = 7% case. Each
parent of 1900 had schooling human capital of b h1900 = 3:1, but with " = :2 had a market valuation equal
to that from b h1+"
1900 = 3:89 units, were each unit of human capital paid the same wage. However, given
the household income, higher b h1+"
1900 leads to a somewhat lower wage w1900: This lower wage reduces
human capital goods inputs x1900. Also, it is b h1900 rather than b h1+"
1900 that enters into the human capital
production function, so there is no boost to quality associated with the chosen inputs. b h1+"
1900 does,
26The possibility of mother￿ s altering their time devoted to child quality is deferred to the third experiment (Increased
Taste for Child Quality) for two reasons, where the motivation for its inclusion is stronger.
36however, increase the hf1900 and hm1900 and in that way increases the quality variables x1900 and s1900.
Why are the increases in schooling capital and the reductions in fertility each too small? 27 What
is ￿ wrong￿with the ￿ Human Capital￿calibration? Inspection of the schooling input demand equations
reveals that they are increasing in the parental stocks of human capital. But, in the human capital
calibration, male human capital is actually falling over time. Female human capital does rise, but not
enough to increase the parental stock. One problem in the human capital story is that the reduction
in returns to experience more than o⁄sets the early increase in schooling human capital. Thus, the
￿ supply-side￿driver of human capital identi￿ed by Lord and Rangazas (2006) is not operative. The
remaining forces increasing schooling human capital are insu¢ ciently powerful (even were the returns
to experience held constant). The rising wage per unit of human capital wt, and a falling price of
schooling goods inputs Pt both serve to increase the goods input xt. However, neither of these increases
the time input of students st. Another contributor to rising schooling human capital is the rise in
general schooling productivity over time (the e¢ ciency scalar bp increases 65% in the rh = 4% case, a
much smaller 17% in the rh = 7% case). Considering the rh = 4% case, even if schooling inputs (and
mom￿ s human capital) were unchanged, b h1+" would still rise by 65% (of the large total increase of 500%
this case requires).
Adding in Mortality and Reduced Time for Mother in Child Quantity
The second experiment adds in the actual time path for infant and child mortality. It took the
parents of 1875￿ s 1.47 live births to produce a surviving child in 1875, falling to 1.098 for the parents of
1925 ( d1;1875 = 1:47, d1;1925 = 1:098). The number of children reaching age 1 required to produce a child
surviving to adulthood, d2; fell from 1:14 to 1:018: Signi￿cantly, since d1 falls by a larger percentage
than d2, these mortality reductions will, ceteris paribus, cause the quality variables xt and st to decline.
IInsert Tables 7 and 8 about hereJ
Additionally, we allow for the possibility of technological improvements in child care-better home
appliances, for example- which reduce ￿t over time (as in Greenwood, Sheshardi, and Yorukoglu (2005))
and reductions in the morbidity accompanying childbirth (as in Albanesi and Olivetti (2007)) which
reduce ￿t. In particular, in both cases, mother￿ s time required per child surviving from age 1 to
adulthood, falls from ￿1875 = :048 for the parents of 1875 to :040 for the parents of 1925. Also, the
time costs to moms of pregnancy and the child￿ s ￿rst year of life are allowed to fall from ￿1875 = :018 to
27Remember that schooling inputs fall in price from .8 to .2. With unitary own-price elasticity of demand this alone
increases the goods inputs by a factor of 4. Further, in this case (and in most other cases in other experiments), the rise
in the wage per unit of human capital is about 100% (99% in this case). Inspection of the equation governing the goods
input reveals the demand for these inputs is proportional to the wage. Thus, if nothing else was changing these price
changes would increase the goods input by a factor of 8.
37￿1925 = :014. These reductions lower the price of child quantity relative to quality, further hampering
any increase in schooling human capital and reductions in fertility. The results of this experiment are
contained in Tables 7 and 8.
Overall, the results for fertility are about the same as in the human capital experiment. Fertility
d1;1925n1925 = 5:1 (4:88) in the rh = 4% (rh = 7%) case-compard to the target of about 2.6. In the
rh = 4% case, the increase in schooling human capital is 131% (as opposed to the 157% in the human
capital calibration and the 500% target).
Increased ￿ Taste￿for Human Capital
The third experiment introduces several changes in parameters consistent with an increased ￿ taste￿
on the part of households for child quality and child well-being relative to child quantity. The results
are as shown in Tables 9 and 10. As discussed in the literature review, in a household utility function,
decision rules might re￿ ect the outcome of household bargaining between husband and wife. As wives￿
labor force participation and earnings increased relative to husband￿ s and women obtained the franchise,
the bargaining power of wives increased.
IInsert Tables 9 and 10 about hereJ
Also, Zelizer (1985) argues that early in the twentieth century children became emotionally priceless
even as their instrumental value was declining. Economists might rephrase this argument as parents
having moved from an exchange to an altruistic regime in their interactions with children. Regardless of
the exact cause, in the calibrations this is operationalized by increasing the taste parameter emphasizing
investments in child quality  t and decreasing the taste parameter ￿t that is related to child quantity
but does not in￿ uence the desirability of quality investments. Mokyr (2000) and Miller (2008) note
that Progressive Era mothers were taught to clean spaces carefully to eliminate germs, boil water
and milk, make sure children washed hands, and engaged in other activities designed to reduce the
chances of illness and death. Mokyr argues that these activities increased mother￿ s time commitment
to household activities. Since these activities would increase child health, an important aspect of human
capital, mother￿ s time devoted to household production et is now also included as a choice variable,












he. Finally, we envision that children￿ s consumption or well-being even
as a dependent is a superior good. Consequently, as income rose through time so did the share of
potential parental earnings devoted to child consumption per child ￿t. Thus, while for the parents of
1875 ￿1875 = :04, the calibration increases it to ￿1925 = :06 for the parents of 1925. The parametric
assumptions are summarized in Table 4.
Given the inclusion of et and the speci￿ed changes in ￿t; the taste parameters  t and ￿t were altered
to achieve, if possible, targets for choice variables, including fertility and schooling inputs for human
38capital. These adjustments improve the ￿t dramatically for the following reasons. Viewing the child
quality equations, it is seen that xt; b st and et are positively related to  t and negatively related to ￿t.
This makes sense as  t is the preference parameter for that portion of aggregate wealth of adult children
associated with schooling human capital, while ￿t is that associated with the exogenous unskilled human
capital which is increasing in the quantity of surviving children. However, these equations also reveal
that as  =￿ increases, the positive e⁄ect of   on child quality diminishes. The e⁄ect of ￿t on the
quantity of surviving children nt+1 (and therefore fertility) is theoretically ambiguous.28
We supplement this mechanism with an increasing share of potential parental wealth devoted to
per child consumption ￿t over time. In particular, we allow ￿t to rise from ￿1875 = :04 to ￿1900 = :05
to ￿1925 = :06. This has a powerful e⁄ect of increasing the cost of an additional child of given quality,
inducing a substitution toward child quality, away from quantity of children (again see the equations for
schooling inputs and surviving children). Notice that if ￿t were not increasing over time, there would
be signi￿cant downward pressures on the share of potential family earnings spent on all children, given
the large decline in fertility. Even the postulated per child increase results in a much lower aggregate
share of potential family earnings devoted to child consumption over time.29
Allowing mother￿ s time devoted to child quality to change also improves the ￿t: et enters directly
into the production function for schooling human capital so that b ht+1 increases with ￿ and  , while
falling in ￿. In both the rh cases, the increase is from 0.5 percent per child to 0.9 percent per child. This
80% increase by itself leads to an 6.1% increase in the endogenously produced human capital (recalling
that the exponent on et = 0:10).
The outputs of this calibration experiment hit most target variables directly (Tables 9 and 10).
Consider ￿rst the case where rh = 7%. Children ever born among the parents of 1925 is now 2.69
(where the target was 2.6); the gender wage ratio is :60 (the target :603); the ratio of schooling human
capital to the initial level is 3:53 (the target was 3:46). The fraction of women￿ s lives devoted to market
work increases from 5% to 28%. This 360% increase is comfortably within the plausible range identi￿ed
in Table 2. The fraction of time devoted to schooling st = b st + st increases from 0:085 to 0:327 while
the target is 0:31. The 1940 value of the goods input is 23:8 times the 1865 value. This exceeds the
target of 16:5-fold increase. In this case Pt fell from 0.8 to 0.3; if the decline in Pt was a bit smaller,
this target could be hit as well.
28In the range of values relevant to the calibration this e⁄ect is positive and, further, the e⁄ect of ￿t can be seen to
dominate that of  t (unless  t is several times larger than ￿t). Thus, as we continue to increase  t relative to ￿t, the
e⁄ects on schooling inputs and fertility decline.
29This is private consumption; recall, children also bene￿t from the household production of communal goods Gt. Private
consumption includes square feet of bedroom, quality and quantity of clothes, spending money for food and entertainment,
etc.
39The ￿t for high case rh = 4% is just as good (see Table 9). Fertility declines to 2:63 (with the target
of 2:6). ￿1970 = 0:603 as targeted. Schooling human capital rose to 6:46, compared to the target of
7:2. As in the rh = 7% case, the student time input is very close while the goods input again rises too
much. Mother￿ s market time is again within the range from Table 2. Thus, the increased ￿ taste￿for
child quality experiment is quite successful at reproducing the revolution in family behavior between
1875 and 1940.
7 Discussion and Summary
This paper developed a microeconomic model of household fertility, human capital accumulation, and
married female labor force participation in which successive generations are linked through parental
human capital. That framework is su¢ ciently general to allow simultaneous examination of several
mechanisms proposed as explanations of the great changes in family behavior in the generations fol-
lowing the Civil War. An initial baseline for the model was calibrated and then theoretical simulations
were performed to assess the relative importance of those mechanisms. It was found that a ￿ human
capital￿story, based on falling prices for educational goods inputs, rising parental incomes, SBTC, and
falling returns to market work experience was incapable of producing the targeted increase in schooling
human capital, or the observed increase in time devoted by students to school, and actual decline in
fertility; the quantity-quality trade-o⁄ contained in the model was too weak when confronted with this
pattern of parameter changes over time.
A second experiment altered the ￿ human capital￿calibration by incorporating empirical rates of
infant and child mortality, and allowing maternal time costs per child (unrelated to child quality) to
fall across generations. This experiment not only did not improve the ￿t of the model to the targets,
it made it somewhat worse. The features added to yield this experiment reduce the price of surviving
children. Despite features from the ￿ human capital￿experiment which boost schooling capital- most
importantly productivity advance in human capital production- the overall result is that the fertility of
parents beginning adulthood in 1925 was only marginally below that of parents beginning adulthood in
1875 (falling from 5.2 to 5.1, whereas the empirical decline is to 2.6). The human capital in adulthood
of females barely rises over the period, while that of males actually falls. As in the human capital
calibration, the force of declining returns to experience largely o⁄set the force of a 3-4 times increase in
schooling human capital. Intuitively, the declines in return to experience were also-perhaps especially-
felt in unskilled occupations and, in the latter 19th century unskilled human capital was the majority
of total human capital. Signi￿cantly, though, in otherwise identical calibrations except that the returns
to experience are kept constant (not reported), the rise in human capital and the decline in fertility
40remain far too small. Additional forces are required to su¢ ciently spur schooling investments and curb
fertility.
This leads to the third experiment, which highlights mechanisms stressed in prominent recent work
in this area. Miller (2008) and Doepke and Tertilt (2009) point to the extension of the franchise to
women and increases in women￿ s relative wages as factors increasing the in￿ uence of women in the
economy and at home. Increases in women￿ s power have been seen to result in increased spending on
the education, health, food and clothing of children. This is captured in our calibrations by several
parametric assumptions. First, there is an increase in the relative preference  t for child quality pro-
duced by parents (from schooling human capital) compared to ￿t; which re￿ ects the taste for exogenous
wealth per child (deriving from unskilled human capital). Both  t and ￿t re￿ ect a taste for surviv-
ing children; an increase in  t/￿t increases the household preference of quality of children relative to
quantity of children. A second, and related, change is that the share of potential adult earnings de-
voted to the consumption of dependent children is allowed to increase over time, re￿ ecting increased
concern with the relative well-being of each dependent child. This increases the cost of child quantity
relative to child quality. Finally, mothers were allowed to increase the time they spent on each child￿ s
human capital development. Collectively, these forces produced in the calibrations the same powerful
quantity-quality trade-o⁄ observed empirically for this period.
The important parametric changes underlying the ￿ human capital￿and ￿ mortality￿experiments,
changes in mortality rates and returns to experience, have been carefully examined in the literature.
This increases con￿dence in the ￿nding that neither the pure human capital story, nor that augmented
with mortality considerations, are capable of reproducing observed movements in fertility and human
capital investments. Certainly there is less direct evidence about changes in the weight given to house-
hold member￿ s taste parameters, as summarized by changing weights in a unitary household utility
function. Similarly, although it would be surprising were consumption per child not a superior good
over this period, empirical validation, let alone quanti￿cation, is lacking. Suppose these mechanisms are
not responsible for the dramatic changes in family behavior during the latter portion of the nineteenth
century and ￿rst few decades of the twentieth century. It then seems likely that other, less immediately
apparent, mechanisms must be operating. At a minimum, the current study suggests fruitful directions
for empirical work.
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1870 74 0.484 35.82 1.00 1.15
1875 84 1.14
1880 78 0.578 45.08 1.05 1.45
1885 106 1.43
1890 121 0.543 65.70 1.64 2.11
1895 155 2.09
1900 165 0.505 83.33 2.23 2.68
1905 200 2.70
1910 264 0.592 156.29 3.57 5.03
1915 284 3.84
1920 323 0.643 207.68 4.36 6.68
1925 463 6.26
1930 573 0.699 400.53 7.74 12.87
1935 540 7.30
1940 620 0.748 463.76 (516)2 8.38 14.9 (16.6)
1Estimated (See Text)
2Includes expenditures of those 18-19 in college in 1941, see footnote 13
3Numbers in column 3 are displayed as proportions
42Table A2: Children￿ s Time in School
1 2 3 4 5
School Year beginning product/365 percentage enrolled2 days attended product
18651 0.085
1870 79.4 0.484 38.43 0.105
1875 79.4
1880 80.0 0.578 46.24 0.12
1885 84.1
1890 86.6 0.543 47.02 0.129
1895 94.8
1900 98.0 0.505 49.49 0.136
1905 106.0
1910 111.8 0.592 66.19 0.181
1915 120.9
1920 125.9 0.643 80.95 0.222
1925 135.9
1930 144.0 0.699 100.62 0.276
1935 146.3
1940 150.7 0.748 112.69 0.309
1Estimated (see Text)
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